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The social information available to us at any given moment is, at best, ambiguous.  
Yet, remarkably, we are able to efficiently resolve this ambiguity and successfully 
navigate the social world.  In this dissertation I use a rational inference framework to 
understand how we form rich, and largely accurate, social perceptions given this 
uncertain and underconstrained information.  Our perceptions, of course, do not always 
perfectly align with reality, but – contrary to the classic perspective in social psychology 
– this is not evidence that we are irrational.  In this dissertation I show how social biases 
can arise not as a failure of rationality, but as a consequence of making optimal use of 
statistical structure in the world.  In Chapter 1, I demonstrate that our visual system’s 
strategy to circumvent resource limitations by capitalizing on redundancy in visual scenes 
can result in a bias to perceive faces in a crowd as more attractive.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I 
show that two of the most well-known social biases – The Fundamental Attribution Error 
and Role-conferred Advantage – are not actually evidence of irrational reasoning.  
 xii 
Although in these paradigms observers seem “bias” to systematically make attributions 
that are in a direction consistent with observed behavior, these judgments fall naturally 
out of optimal probabilistic inference.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a long and powerful tradition in psychology to view human social 
reasoning as irrational and full of biases (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 2011). And although 
biases are indeed perceptions that differ from reality, the traditional view is that these 
inaccuracies are caused by reasoning that deviates from rationality, and are indicative of 
information-processing failures.  But errors in our impressions and perceptions can arise 
even when we are using information in a reasonable or even optimal way, simply because 
we are working with incomplete or uncertain information.  
Social reasoning usually involves underconstrained problems, wherein the 
available information is insufficient to identify a single answer, so even an ideal observer 
using all available information must exercise some ‘inductive bias’ (Griffiths, et al. 2010) 
to come up with an answer, and must thus produce some systematic errors.  Solving 
unconstrained inference problems is not just an issue when we are trying to figure out the 
source of complex social behavior, but is present in even the most basic interactions we 
have with our environment.  For example, we determine the color of an object based on 
the wavelength of light that hits our retina, but because the spectrum we sense is 
determined not just by the reflectance of the objects’ surface, but also the spectrum of the 
light that is illuminating the object.  It is impossible to deduce the state of the world based 
on only the information directly available to us, since multiple combinations of causal 
factors could yield the same observed experience, yet somehow we are able to come up 
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with internally consistent percepts that are generally well calibrated to the world.  
Bayesian probabilistic inference has been used as a framework to understand how 
humans might solve such underdetermined problems by using ‘inductive biases’ that 
reflect accumulated knowledge about the statistical structure in the world — for example 
using prior probabilities about surfaces and illuminants – to make reasonable guess about 
what is the most likely source of the data we are experiencing.  In this dissertation I adopt 
this rational inference framework to understand how we form rich, and largely accurate, 
social perceptions given incomplete and ambiguous information, and show how social 
biases can arise not as a failure of rationality, but as a consequence of making optimal 
use of statistical structure in the world.  
In Chapter 1 I demonstrate how the optimal use of statistical structure in visual 
scenes can result in a bias to perceive people to be more attractive than they are.  
Our visual system is bombarded by more information than we can effectively process – 
whether we are looking at leaves on a tree or faces in crowd, we are often unable to 
accurately encode all of the individual elements presented to us.  But a lot of this 
information is redundant, and our visual system takes advantage of this redundancy by 
automatically extracting a summary representation of all the similar elements (Ariely, 
2001, Chong & Treisman, 2003). When we have perceptual uncertainty about an 
individual item we perceive it to be biased toward the group average, which, in aggregate, 
makes our judgment better (Brady & Alvarez, 2011).  I show that this useful tendency to 
perceive items as bias toward the ensemble average has the side effect of systematically 
distorting faces to be perceived as more attractive than they are.  When we see faces in a 
group our visual system automatically forms an average representation,  and the 
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individual faces are perceived to be biased toward this group average. Since average 
faces tend to be more attractive (Langlois & Roggman, 1990), this biasing of individual 
faces toward a group average causes the “cheerleader effect”: a face in a group looks 
better than the same face alone.   
Importantly, although this “cheerleader effect” is indeed a perception that 
systematically deviates from reality, it is not the result of an information-processing 
failure.  Quite the contrary, ensemble coding is a sophisticated processing strategy that 
allows us to overcomes cognitive resource limitations by making optimal use of available 
information.  It makes fast and efficient visual processing possible, and even aids real-
time social interactions, such as allowing us to quickly discern the collective direction of 
a crowds’ gaze (Sweeny & Whitney, 2014) the direction that a crowd is moving (Sweeny 
et al., 2013), and a groups’ average emotion and gender (Haberman & Whitney, 2009).  
The “cheerleader effect” is merely a byproduct of a globally efficient strategy. 
In Chapter 2 and 3 I argue that just as we rely on structure in a visual scene to 
resolve uncertainty in our perceptions, we similarly rely on accumulated social 
experiences to resolve ambiguity when making more abstract social attributions, such as 
inferring disposition. And just as globally useful reliance on ensemble information can 
result in perceptual biases, an optimal social inference process can result in two of the 
most well-known, and widely accepted, biases in social psychology: the fundamental 
attribution error (FAE) and the role-conferred advantage. 
According to the fundamental attribution error, we do not properly consider the 
pressure of the situation, and are prone to think others’ behavior is caused by their 
disposition (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995). For instance, participants who read an essay 
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that argues in favor of marijuana legalization, and are told that the author was assigned 
this position, still think that the author is personally in favor of legalization.  The classic, 
and widely uncontested, account argues that it is unreasonable for people to attribute a 
behavior to disposition when they know that it was caused by the situation; consequently, 
studies documenting attribution to disposition in such cases have long been interpreted as 
evidence that people underappreciate the power of situations, and over-attribute to 
dispositions.  
In Chapter 2 and 3 I challenge this view, and show that this extensive literature 
does not actually provide evidence that social reasoning is systematically flawed. In 
Chapter 2 I show – using classic data and three new experiments-- that the logic used by 
classic theorists is sound only for situations known to be deterministically strong (i.e. the 
person wrote the essay with a gun to their head), but crumbles in the vast majority of 
situations that are not deterministic (an assignment from a course instructor would not 
compel every person to endorse a position at odds with their beliefs).  Unlike 
deterministic situations, which completely explain the behavior, thus entirely “explaining 
away” the role of disposition, probabilistic situations that exert some – but not complete 
– influence on behavior should only partially explain away dispositional attributions. 
When inferring the situational or dispositional causes of behavior in such under-
constrained, probabilistic environments, inferring some role of disposition is the correct 
inference to make.  
In Chapter 3 I investigate a phenomenon that is conceptually similar to the FAE, 
known as the role-conferred advantage: the idea that we don’t properly account for the 
benefits that social roles confer when making attributions. In a series of five experiments 
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I demonstrate that observers (a) are not insensitive to the advantages conferred and 
disadvantages imposed by social roles, (b) show that observers are better calibrated to the 
social-roles used in this paradigm than has been argued, and (c) also make sensible use of 
other information available to them. In short: the way we reason about others’ internal 
qualities is not irrational, but a natural consequence of optimal probabilistic inference. 
Conclusion 
When navigating the social world we have only ambiguous or incomplete 
information available to us at any given moment, and it is therefore impossible to deduce 
the true state of the world.  Our inferential infrastructure solves these problem by taking 
advantage of the statistical structure present in our social world—we rely on our 
knowledge of how the world work in general to help resolve our uncertainty in an 
optimal way.  Although our social perception can deviate from reality, this is not –at least 
in the cases I address-- because our social reasoning process is irrational or systematically 
flawed.  In fact, systematic deviations from reality – perceiving faces as more attractive 
in crowd, or inferring internal-qualities to in a direction consistent with behavior—
actually arise as a consequence of rational inference.   
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ABSTRACT 
 We do not directly observe the internal qualities of others, such as their attitudes 
and dispositions, so we must infer them from behavior. Although classic attribution 
theories agree that we consider situational pressures when estimating such internal 
qualities, one of the best-known results in psychology is that we commit the Fundamental 
Attribution Error: we are systematically biased to overestimate the influence of 
disposition on behavior.  We propose that the social judgments made in classic studies of 
attribution have been interpreted as biased only because they have been compared to an 
inappropriate benchmark predicated on the assumption of deterministic dispositions and 
situations. We review six classic results and present empirical data that demonstrates that 
social inferences are consistent with unbiased probabilistic attribution of the influence of 
situations and dispositions in an uncertain world 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you’re visiting a donation only museum. You see a fellow patron drop $5 
into the “pay what you can” donation jar. Do you conclude that she is generous? This 
inference would likely be influenced by how much pressure there was to make a donation. 
For example, whether or not there was a museum docent monitoring the donation jar. 
Since internal qualities such as “generosity” cannot be directly observed, we must infer 
them from others’ behavior. But behavior is influenced not only by these internal 
qualities, but also by external circumstances, such whether or not a docent is observing 
your donation. Thus, attributing a behavior to internal qualities or external situations is an 
underdetermined problem.  
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An extensive literature suggests that there are systematic discrepancies between 
the inferences about internal qualities that people should make, and the inferences they do 
make. A considerable number of behavioral experiments using rich social situations have 
concluded that we have a tendency to attribute a person’s behavior disproportionately to 
their disposition, disregarding the influence of known situational pressure. That is, when 
we witness someone make a donation we are prone to think that she is a generous, and 
not properly consider the pressure imposed by a watchful docent.  The Fundamental 
Attribution Error1 (FAE) is one of the most famous concepts in social psychology, has 
spawned numerous theoretical explanations (for review see Gilbert & Malone, 1995), is 
featured prominently in introductory psychology texts, and is referenced often in popular 
culture (e.g. Gladwell, 2000). In the classic demonstration of the FAE, university students 
read an essay, ostensibly written by a classmate, which either favored or opposed Fidel 
Castro (Jones & Harris, 1967). Even when told that the writers were assigned their 
position by a course instructor, readers still thought that the author actually held the view 
expressed in the essay. A large number of studies have since produced similar results, 
yielding a net assessment in the literature that people are “lay dispositionalists” (Ross & 
Nisbett, 1991) – wired to neglect situational pressure and attribute actions to stable 
internal qualities. The inferences observers make in such experiments are typically 
considered to be logically unwarranted. For example, the most comprehensive review of 
the FAE states: 
                                                
1The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) is often used interchangeably with the 
Correspondence Bias (CB) in the literature, but some authors have distinguished the FAE 
as the tendency to underappreciate the influence of situation, which is then a cause of the 
CB (e.g., Gawronski, 2004), the tendency to over-attribute behavior to disposition.   
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“..when people observe behavior, they often conclude that the person who 
performed the behavior was predisposed to do so—that the person's 
behavior corresponds to the person's unique dispositions—and they draw 
such conclusions even when a logical analysis suggests they should not.” 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995) 
 
The classic normative models reason that when you witness an outcome, and then 
learn that it was caused by one event, it is inappropriate to use that outcome as evidence 
for another potential causal event (e.g. Kelly, 1973; Jones & Davis, 1965). For example, 
if you flip on a light switch and the light doesn’t turn on there are two likely 
explanations: the light-bulb is burnt out, or there is no electricity. If you then learn that 
the power is out across the city, there is no reason to believe that there is anything wrong 
with the bulb. According to this deterministic logic, if you read a pro-Castro essay and 
learn that the author had been assigned by an instructor to write in support of Castro, it is 
illogical to also take the essay as evidence that the author favors Castro.  
Most isolated social situations, however, are not so powerful that they completely 
constrain behavior, like an electrical outlet carrying no power. In daily life people rarely 
encounter situations that are so extreme that everyone acts uniformly within them. Even 
when society takes great care to make behavior as constrained by the situation as possible 
(e.g. locking someone in jail), these situations are still not totally deterministic (people 
still escape from jail). Outside of such extremes, situational pressures are far from 
deterministic, but rather interact with internal qualities to produce behavior: some people 
would not make an optional donation even when a docent were watching, while others 
would make donation even without a witness. The situations akin to those used in FAE 
tasks are also far from deterministic; for example, when Sherman (1980) asked university 
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students to write an essay supporting a controversial school policy, less than 70 percent 
of students complied. Thus, even when a situation is presumed to be influential, it is not 
reasonable for people to assume that it will completely determine behavior. But how 
should we reason about peoples’ dispositions when actions only partially constrain 
behavior? For this we turn to the formalism of causal attribution in probabilistic inference. 
 Recent work suggests that human causal learning and inference can be explained 
within a framework of probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks (Pearl 1988; Griffiths 
& Tenenbaum, 2005; 2009) On this account, we form a causal model of the world, and 
condition on our observations to infer what might have been true of the world to yield the 
outcomes we observed. This reasoning framework can account for a wide range of the 
causal inductions made by humans (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011), including social inferences, 
such as inferring goals from the movement of simple animated agents (e.g. Baker, Saxe, 
& Tenenbaum, 2009). We propose that the social inferences made in classic FAE studies 
can also be accounted for within this framework, and that given uncertainty about the 
strength of situational variables, human tendencies to infer internal qualities in these 
paradigms do not reflect a bias, but are actually quite sensible. 
In the past there have been scattered proposals that the social inference process 
could be accounted for in terms of probabilistic inference (Azjen & Fishbein, 1975; 
Morris & Larrick, 1995). However, as these proposals predated modern computational 
statistical methods (Griffiths & Tenenbaum 2005, 2009; Kemp & Tenenbaum 2009), they 
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could offer only verbal descriptions and conceptual possibilities2 without being able to 
make concrete predictions about the variety of manipulations in the decades of 
established FAE literature.  
In this paper we first explain how an unbiased agent should make inferences 
about dispositions in non-constraining situations using Bayesian inference. We then show 
that this framework yields six classic results in the FAE literature3: attributing to 
disposition in the presence of explanatory situational pressures (Jones & Harris; 1967), 
the influence of prior beliefs on dispositional attribution (Jones et al; 1971), modulation 
of attitude attribution by action intensity (including attribution of opposite attitudes from 
weak actions; Jones et al; 1971), interpreting ambiguous behavior (and disposition) in 
light of the situation (Snyder & Frankel, 1976), and attributing to situations in the 
presence of explanatory dispositional pressures (Quattrone; 1982). Our results show that 
the patterns of behavior interpreted as systematic flaws in our social inferences instead 
reflect the best possible inferences that observers can make given their uncertainty about 
other people and the situation.  
 
Probabilistic Social Attribution 
Given the uncertainty inherent in reasoning about the causes of others’ behavior, 
we cannot expect people to make errorless social inferences. Consequently, the relevant 
question for assessing whether we make such inferences with systematic flaws is not 
                                                
2However, see Jennings (2010) for an alternative quantitative Bayesian conceptualization 
of the FAE and the our Discussion for a comparison of his framework with the account 
we propose here. 	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whether we make errors at all, but rather whether these errors are inconsistent with those 
an unbiased observer would make. Thus, we must compare human social attribution to an 
unbiased observer operating under the same information. How, for instance, would an 
unbiased observer infer the generosity of a museum patron who makes a donation while a 
watchful docent is present?  
We have suggested that the influence of the situation and the influence of the 
person’s disposition will combine to yield the probability of taking a specific action. This 
can be expressed as a simple three-node graphical model (Figure 2.1; Pearl, 1988): The 
probability of making a donation will be a function of the situation (docent present/not 
present) and the individual’s disposition (how generous the person is).  
 
	  
Figure 2.1. Graphical model of an action arising from the combination of two classes of 
causes: Situation and disposition both influence the probability that an action will occur. 
Various attribution experiments amount to conditioning on (observing) two of the three 
nodes (usually situation and action), and inquiring about the third (disposition).	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In this scenario, we treat behavior as a simple, binary action: the museum patron 
either leaves a donation, or doesn’t. We can express the binary action a (donate or not) as 
a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with some latent probability of donating (q). 
Situation (s) and disposition (d) will both influence this probability; for simplicity and 
convention, we will assume that their influence on q is additive in log-odds. Thus, 
situation influence (s) and disposition influence (d) can take on real values from negative 
infinity to positive infinity: positive numbers reflect influences that encourage a behavior 
(donating) and negative numbers discourage the behavior (not donating).  The log-odds 
of an individual donating is thus the sum of the situational and dispositional influences 
expressed in this manner: log[q/(1-q)]=s+d. Therefore, the probability of donating can be 
obtained via the logistic transformation of the sum of the situational and dispositional 
influences:  
 
q = 11+ e[−(s+d )]  
Under this model, the probability of making a donation is q, and the probability of not 
donating is 1-q: 
 
 
 
   
p(a | q,θ ) = 10
!
"
#
q
1− q
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where θ has no influence (it is a place-holder for more sophisticated likelihood functions 
that could capture graded action strengths, described later). 
 This formulation offers an intuitive interpretation of “situation strength” (s) and 
“disposition strength” (d) as our expectation about how people will act. A person with a 
disposition of d=0 is equally likely to take the chosen action or not in an unconstrained 
situation (e.g., a person with this disposition and no pressure from a docent would donate 
50% of the time). People with positive disposition strengths will be more likely than 
chance to take the chosen action in an unconstrained situation (e.g., when there is no 
pressure from a docent a person with this disposition d=1 would donate 73% of the time: 
log(q/(1-q)) = 1; q = 0.73), and people with negative disposition scores will be less likely 
(e.g., d=(-1) yields a 27% chance of donation for a person when no docent is present). 
The situation strength reflects how much the situation changes these probabilities.  A 
non-constraining situation has situation strength s=0, and so the probability of taking an 
action (e.g., donating) relies only on the actor’s disposition. Positive situation strengths 
represent conditions that encourage taking the chosen action (e.g., a watchful docent), 
while negative situation strengths represent conditions that discourage donating (e.g., 
learning people often steal from the donation jar). So, for example, if you expect 73% of 
people to donate (average disposition of d=1), but 92% of people donate when the docent 
is watching, this would indicate that the situational influence of the docent is s=1.5 
(log(0.92/(1-0.92)) = s+1; s=1.5: or equivalently, ). 
Although in most FAE experiments, action can be considered to be dichotomous 
(either one action is taken, or its alternative), in the real-world action is rarely 
dichotomous, but instead can take on fine gradations.  When we are dealing with binary 
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actions (donating or not donating) situation (s) and disposition (d) combine to influence 
the probability (q) that one of two outcomes occurs. However, if we want to consider the 
intensity of the action we can expand the donation situation and imagine that the actor 
found an envelope containing $20 in single bills before encountering the donation jar, and 
can ask how much of this money does she donate? This allows us to treat the action not 
as binary but as a continuous variable, to capture the intuition that donating $20 means 
something quite different than donating $1. Thus, if we have only dichotomous 
information about an action, we link action propensity (q) to the action via a Bernoulli 
likelihood (yielding binary actions 0 or 1).  But if we have graded information about 
action intensity, we can describe it as falling anywhere on the interval of [0 to 1], and we 
formulate the likelihood linking action propensity (q) to action (a) as a Beta distribution: 
  
 
 
where 𝜃  is the concentration parameter, indicating dispersion around the central tendency 
of. This formulation yields action strengths ranging from strongly negative (0), through 
neutral (.5) to very positive (1). It is sufficient for capturing the data in the classic FAE 
studies where action intensity is reported on a bounded interval (usually a Likert scale).   
So far, we have only explained how situation and disposition might combine to 
determine the probability that a specific action did or did not occur. But in most cases, 
people know the situation (or at least have a pretty good guess), observe an action, and 
must infer the disposition. Reasoning backwards, to infer the disposition, requires 
inverting the causal model, by relying on the rules of conditional probability and our 
P(a | q,θ ) = β(a | qθ, (1− q)θ )
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prior expectations about the distribution of dispositions in the world: P(d) – e.g., how 
many people are more generous or stingy than average? Given this prior distribution on 
dispositions, and the observation of an action a in a situation of some strength s, we can 
calculate the posterior probability of the generosity of the actor using Bayes rule: 
 
 
 
This calculation yields a posterior probability distribution over the disposition that the 
actor might hold: that is, which dispositions are likely given the situation strength we 
assumed, and the action we observed. Throughout our analyses, we will compare the 
judgments that people make about dispositions with the expected value of this posterior 
over dispositions. 
 
What makes a situation informative about disposition? 
 Under the probabilistic attribution framework an observer should always infer that 
there was some influence of disposition on an observed action. However, the amount that 
is learned about the actor’s disposition will depend on the strength of the situation. That 
is, according to this framework, if you see someone leave a donation at a free museum 
you should always infer some degree of generosity, but how much generosity will depend 
on how much the situation encouraged or discouraged this behavior.  Figure 2.2 shows 
how the posterior distribution about the actor’s disposition changes from the prior after 
P(d | a, s) = P(a | d, s)P(d)P(a | d ', s)P(d ')
d '
∫
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observing a donation under different situation strengths. When there is strong pressure 
against donating we learn a lot about how generous the person is – they must have been 
very generous in order to overcome strong pressure not to donate. But even when the 
situation encourages a donation a we still infer more generosity when we observed a 
donation compared to the prior. It’s only when the pressure to donate is so strong that 
nearly no one would refuse that the inferred generosity becomes indistinguishable from 
the prior. 
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Figure 2.2.  The posterior distribution over disposition after observing a positive action 
(e.g., donating; a=1), under different assumed situation strengths. The grey distribution 
represents the prior distribution of generosity (the generosity that would be inferred if 
nothing else was known about the situation or action). When the situation strongly 
discourages a donation (e.g. s = -4, bright green) but someone donates anyway a lot of 
generosity is inferred because it must have taken a lot of generosity to overcome the 
pressure of the situation. When the situation only weakly discourages the action (s = -1) 
but someone donates anyway less generosity is inferred because less generosity is needed 
to overcome the pressure of the situation. However, even when the situation slightly (s = 
1) or moderately (s =2) encourages a donation some generosity beyond the prior is still 
inferred. However, when the situation nearly forces a donation (s = 4) seeing someone 
donate yields essentially no information about the actor’s disposition since everyone 
would act this way regardless of their disposition. Thus, as situation becomes extremely 
strong, implying that it alone deterministically caused the action, probabilistic attribution 
will yield results consistent with deterministic, ‘logical’ attribution: no inferences about 
disposition will be made when situations force the observed action. 
 
Let’s imagine we are now in a world with somewhat more stingy museum patrons 
than before, where only 50% people would donate when no docent is watching (here 
represented by the prior ). Now you observe someone leave a donation (s=0). Based on 
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the equation above, you should infer that the visitor is somewhat more generous than 
average (E[d|s=0,a=1]=0.39, Figure 2.3 point A). 
 
Figure 2.3. The strength and direction of the inferred disposition by a probabilistic social 
attribution model	  depends on the situational pressure in combination with whether the 
action occurred. For example,  if a donation occurred (+) when there was a lot of pressure 
to donate, the ideal observer makes weaker inferences about the actors’ generosity (point 
C). However, when there is stronger situational pressure that discourages donating and 
the person donates anyway, the ideal observer infers the actor is more generous than 
average (point B). Symmetrically, not donating (! .) when there is strong pressure to 
donate (point D) suggests the person is far below average on this trait, compared to when 
the person doesn’t donate but there was also strong pressure against donating (Point E). 
The ideal observer will always infer a disposition consistent with the observed action 
(though this will become vanishingly small as situations become nearly deterministic; 
more extreme than points C and E, respectively). 
 
But what if there is strong pressure against donating? For instance, if the donation 
jar is missing (s=-3) yet a the person leaves a donation anyway, you should infer even 
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more strongly that they are generous (E[d|s=-3,a=1]=.75, Figure 2.3 point B). If the 
action occurred despite pressure against the action, it must have been motivated by 
disposition, and strong dispositional inferences are made. 
Conversely, if the situation strongly encourages the action, for example the docent 
says to the person “the museum will likely be closing if patrons refuse to donate” (s=3), 
the unbiased observer will still infer something about the patron’s disposition 
(E[d|s=3,a=1]=.08, Figure 2.3 point C), since there are some people who still would not 
leave a donation in that situation. As long as situations are not deterministic, the ideal 
observer should make some dispositional attribution, but the strength of that attribution 
should be modulated by situation strength.  
 
Applying Probabilistic Attribution to Classic FAE Results 
For the remainder of this paper we ask how well the probabilistic attribution 
framework captures human inferences in classic social attribution experiments from the 
Fundamental Attribution Error literature. We limit our discussion to the classic studies 
that have been directly interpreted as evidence for a FAE.4  We first consider Jones and 
                                                
4 Here we do not, for example, consider process models such as studies that show that 
“cognitively busy” individuals make stronger inferences about disposition (e.g.  Trop & 
Alfieri, 1997). Such work takes the FAE as an assumption, but provides no explicit 
evidence per se for bias, and is thus beyond the scope of this analysis. We also do not 
address the role-conferred advantage paradigm (e.g. Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977) 
which requires accounting for the behavior of multiple actors simultaneously, and is thus 
beyond the scope of this instantiation of our model. 
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Harris’ (1967) seminal essay paradigm in which participants attribute a disposition to an 
essay author even when that author was forced to take that position. Because the FAE 
literature is so extensive and often uses this essay task with modifications that are 
tangential to testing predictions of probabilistic social attribution (e.g. Miller, Jones & 
Hinkle, 1981), we only focus on versions of the classic essay task that are modified in 
ways that allow us the opportunity to test novel predictions beyond what could be 
demonstrated with this classic study.  
The first modification of the essay task that we address is a slightly more complex 
scenario in which people have pre-existing beliefs about the author (Jones et al, 1971).  
Next, we examine a study wherein the strength of the argument presented in the essay is 
manipulated (Jones et al, 1971), and then explore a puzzling result for the FAE 
hypothesis: what do people do if the classic paradigm is inverted -- when they are asked 
to infer the strength of the situation after reading an essay written by an author with a 
known disposition (Quattrone, 1982).  Finally, we consider a more subtle experiment 
than the essay paradigm in which behavior is held constant, but observers have different 
beliefs about the situation (Snyder & Frankel, 1976).   
In all cases we find a qualitative match between human behavior and probabilistic 
social attribution. For ease of comparing probabilistic inference with human judgments, 
for all of the studies we consider we have scaled the posterior beliefs of the ideal observer 
to the scales used in the respective empirical studies.5  
                                                                                                                                            	  
5For example, if the original experiment asked for attitude reports on a 1-6 Likert scale 
the ideal observer’s judgments would be converted in this way:  1+5/(1+exp(-E[d|a,s])). 
Furthermore, even though we presume that human intuitions are probabilistic, we report 
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Inferred attitude when action is encouraged by the situation (Jones & Harris, 1967) 
In the classic FAE experiment, Jones and Harris (1967) examined how people 
account for situational pressures when reasoning about others’ dispositions. Based on a 
deterministic view of such inferences, they reasoned that a behavior is evidence of a 
person’s disposition, but when there is a situational explanation for the behavior it should 
longer reveal anything about the actor’s disposition. They asked university students to 
read an essay that either opposed or endorsed Castro. Participants were told that the essay 
was written by a classmate who was either instructed to argue for a particular position, or 
was free to choose whether to write a pro or a con essay. After reading the essay 
participants answered ten 7-point Likert scale questions (1: strongly anti to 7: strongly 
pro) about what they thought the author’s true attitude toward Castro had been; these ten 
responses were summed, yielding an overall scale from the strongest anti-Castro beliefs 
(10) to the strongest pro-Castro beliefs (70). If the essay position were freely chosen, then 
it obviously reveals the authors’ attitude; however, if instructions to write in support of 
one position or another would make any person — regardless of their disposition — 
produce a compelling essay for the instructed position, then Jones and Harris suggest that 
the essay content should not be informative of the authors’ attitude.  
                                                                                                                                            
point-estimates from the ideal observer by averaging over the posterior distribution in 
order to mirror the point-estimates that human observers were asked to make. 
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As predicted, when readers were told the essay position was freely chosen they 
believed that the author had an attitude about Castro consistent with the views expressed 
in the essay. However, when the reader was told that the position had been assigned, 
readers continued to estimate the authors true attitude to be consistent with the essay’s 
position, albeit more weakly (original data re-plotted in Figure 2.4, panel A). According 
to Jones and Harris this suggests that people behave illogically: people infer something 
about the writer’s attitude when they should explain behavior based on the situation.  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Inferred attitude as a function of essay position, and whether this position was 
chosen or assigned. A: People inferred that the position expressed in an essay was 
indicative of the author’s true attitude both when they chose their position, and when it 
was assigned (Jones & Harris, 1967). The attitude attributed to the author was stronger 
when the author chose his position (solid line), and weaker when assigned (dotted line). 
B: An ideal observer also infers that the essay is indicative of the author’s true attitude, 
but more informative when the position was chosen, and less informative when assigned 
(dotted line). 
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 But what inferences should we expect from an unbiased observer who did not 
believe that instructions to write a particular essay are completely deterministic? We can 
characterize the behavior of such an unbiased observer via a probabilistic social 
attribution model: given the observation of either a pro or anti-Castro essay (a binary 
action), and some assumption about the influence of instruction (situation strength) what 
might the actor’s attitude about Castro be (disposition)? From the logic captured in 
Figure 2.3, we would expect that such an observer would infer some attitude that is 
consistent with the essay even when the position had been assigned. If the instruction to 
write a pro-Castro essay does not completely determine behavior, then those with 
vehemently anti-Castro views might still write an anti-Castro essay; therefore, seeing a 
pro-Castro essay still tells us something about the author’s attitude, namely that the 
person does not dislike Castro enough to resist writing a pro-Castro essay when asked to.   
 So, an unbiased observer believing in non-deterministic influence of situations 
will still infer some disposition, but just how much depends on the observers’ 
assumptions about how compelling the situation is. To formalize this, we must specify 
the “situation strength” of being offered a free choice about which position to take in an 
essay, that of being assigned to write an essay taking a particular position, as well as the 
prior distribution about Castro attitudes. The majority of subjects (readers) reported being 
anti-Castro (Mean=32.5, Variance=35.4 on a scale of 10-70); we used these summary 
statistics to set the prior distribution of attitudes about Castro (d~N(-.53,0.44)6; changing 
this distribution yields a roughly uniform shift in inferred attitude across all four 
                                                
6d~N(-0.53, 0.44) yields the corresponding mean and variance when transformed to the 
10-70 scale: pro-Castro attitude x=10+60/(1+exp[-d]). 
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conditions). We assume that the free choice condition imposes no influence on the 
position that a writer would take (s=0); such that a neutral person (not average, but split 
between positions; d=0) who chooses what to write would be equally likely to produce a 
pro or anti-Castro essay. Further, we assume that the assignment to write a pro- or anti-
Castro essay have situation strengths that would compel a perfectly neutral person to 
write the assigned essay 80% of the time (s=1.38 and -1.38, respectively).  Finally, we 
obtained “likert-like” ratings from the posterior belief about disposition by scaling the 
logistically transformed expected disposition to the 10-70 scale used in the paper.7 
Under these assumptions, an ideal observer infers the same pattern of dispositions 
as people do: when the situation does not exert any pressure (the “choice” conditions) the 
ideal observer treats the attitude expressed in the essay as very informative, and infers 
that the author’s true attitude roughly mirrors what was expressed in the essay. When the 
situation does exert pressure to take a particular position (the “no-choice” condition) both 
humans and the ideal observer treat the behavior as informative (though less so), and 
make correspondingly weaker dispositional attributions (Figure 2.4, panel B). 
It’s critical to note that the qualitative pattern of results (weaker, but non-zero, attribution 
of attitudes in the no-choice condition) holds regardless of the specific assumptions we 
make about prior distributions over d, or situation strength in the no choice condition.   
 
The influence of preconceptions on inferred attitude (Jones et al., 1971) 
The probabilistic social attribution model yielded the critical pattern of inferred 
attitudes observed in the original FAE experiment (Jones & Harris, 1967) under the 
                                                
7Reported pro-Castro attitude = 10+60/(1+exp(-E[d|a,s])). 
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assumption of an expectation that on average people disfavor Castro. This was sufficient 
because participants in that experiment were only told that a classmate wrote the essay. 
However, real-life social situations typically contain much more context that we use to 
flavor our inferences about other people. For example, in the USA, if you meet someone 
at a National Rifle Association rally, that person is more likely to be politically 
conservative, whereas if you meet someone at a Vegan potluck, that person is probably 
politically liberal. The background context should therefore affect how people attribute 
internal qualities to others. 
Jones et al (1971) investigated how prior expectation and action intensity affect 
attribution of beliefs about the legalization of marijuana. Subjects first read a 
questionnaire that the essay author ostensibly filled out. The questionnaire responses 
were designed to alter subjects’ expectations about how conservative the author was, and 
thus how likely they are to support, or oppose, the legalization of marijuana (e.g., an 
author who favors strict abortion laws is likely to be conservative and to oppose 
legalization while an author who opposes strict abortion laws is likely to be liberal and 
support legalization). They then read an essay that either favored or opposed legalization 
of marijuana, and were told that the essay position was either freely chosen, or assigned). 
Then subjects estimated the author’s attitude about marijuana legalization on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1: strongly anti-legalization to 6: strongly pro-legalization).   
Jones et al (1971) found that when the essay was consistent with expectations (an 
anti-legalization essay from someone who was portrayed as conservative; or vice versa), 
readers estimated that author’s attitude was consistent with both the opinion expressed 
and the prior expectation, regardless of whether the person had been assigned the position 
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or chose it freely. However, when the essay was inconsistent with expectations (e.g., a 
pro-legalization essay from a conservative), attributions differed depending on whether 
the essay position was assigned or freely chosen: readers inferred an attitude more 
consistent with the position in the essay when an author ostensibly chose his position, 
than when the position had been assigned (Figure 2.5, panel A). 
 
      
 
Figure 2.5. When the essay position was consistent with expected attitude, people (top) 
attributed the corresponding, consistent attitude to the author, regardless of whether the 
essay position was assigned, or chosen by the author. However, when the essay position 
deviated from the expected attitude, people took the essay as more diagnostic of the 
author’s attitude when the author chose the position, rather than having it assigned. 
Likewise, the probabilistic attribution observer (bottom) infers an attitude maximally 
consistent with the action when the action and prior belief are consistent, regardless of 
situational pressures, but an action inconsistent with expected attitudes is more diagnostic 
of true attitude when there are no extenuating situational pressures.  
 
What inferences should we expect from probabilistic social attribution under the 
assumptions that (1) the instructions to take a certain essay position are not deterministic, 
and (2) expectations about the author change based on the questionnaire? We would 
again expect inferred attitudes to be consistent with the observed action (as discussed 
previously in Figure 2.3), with the strength of this inference modulated by situation 
strength (weaker inference under the no-choice condition); and we would expect that 
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these inferences would yield deviations away from the expected attitude in the general 
population.  Insofar as the essay is consistent with expected attitude, it will give us little 
cause to update our beliefs about the author, but when the essay is inconsistent, it may 
either reflect situational pressures overcoming expected dispositions, or an error in our 
assumptions about the dispositions (or a combination thereof). Thus, the unexpected free-
choice essay should give us most reason to change our beliefs about authors’ disposition, 
and this change in beliefs will be weaker in the no-choice condition – when situation is 
known to have influenced the essay. In short, the probabilistic attribution model is 
expected to yield the same qualitative pattern of behavior as observed in humans.   
To formalize these predictions, we again specify the “situation strength” of being 
assigned a position and of having free choice. For consistency, we retain the same 
situation strength as in the previous scenario: s=1.38 for instructions to write an anti-
legalization essay and s= -1.38 for a pro-legalization essay (these correspond to situations 
that influence 80% of neutral people to write an essay in the instructed position). Again, 
we assume that in the choice condition, the situation strength is 0 – exerting no influence 
on the essay position. Finally, we assume equally strong expectations from the 
questionnaire manipulation: a person who is portrayed as conservative has an expected 
disposition d~N(1.38,.1), and an ostensibly liberal author is assumed to have a disposition 
d~N(-1.38, .1); this means that they would, on average write anti- and pro-legalization 
essays (respectively) 80% of the time when given the choice of which position to take.  
Again, we scaled posterior beliefs about disposition to the 1-6 point Likert scale: reported 
attitude = 1+5/(1+exp(-E[d|a,s])). 
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Probabilistic social attribution with these prior expectations about authors’ beliefs 
infers the same authors’ attitudes as human subjects. When the essay position was 
expected both humans and probabilistic attribution infer that the author held the 
expressed belief, regardless of whether the essay was freely chosen or assigned. However, 
when the essay direction was unexpected both humans and the ideal observer infer a 
stronger attitude in the direction of the essay when it was freely chosen compared to 
when it was assigned.   
Again, it is critical to note that this qualitative pattern of inferences is robust to 
variation in parameters, and that the priors and situation strengths used here are the same 
as those used in the previous experiment. 
 
The influence of action intensity on inferred attitude (Jones et al., 1971) 
Organizing an NRA rally is a more extreme action with regard to Second 
Amendment beliefs than having an NRA membership, or merely owning a hunting rifle.  
In general, since real-world behaviors are not easily classified as dichotomous (donate / 
do not donate), but rather fall along a continuum of extremeness, it is useful to consider 
how people treat varying action strengths. 
To test this Jones et al (1971; Experiment 2) used four essays, varying both the 
direction of the essay (pro- or anti- marijuana legalization), and the extremeness: strongly 
anti-legalization, weakly anti-legalization, weakly pro-legalization, and strongly pro-
legalization. Each subject read one essay, expressing a position that they believed had 
been either chosen or assigned. Based on this information, they estimated the author’s 
attitude about marijuana legalization on a 6 point Likert scale. 
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When the essay position was purportedly freely chosen, subjects thought that the 
author’s attitude scaled with the expressed position: inferred legalization attitude changed 
monotonically from a strong anti essay, to weak anti essay, to weak pro essay, to strong 
pro essay. However, when the essay position (pro or anti) had ostensibly been assigned, 
this monotonic pattern was dramatically disrupted: a weak-anti essay was interpreted as 
indicating a more pro-legalization attitude than a weak-pro essay. That is, when someone 
was assigned to write a pro-legalization essay, but made a weak argument, readers 
inferred that they were actually against Marijuana legalization, and vice versa (Figure 2.6, 
panel A). This negative inference from a positive action is analogous to the inferences we 
might make from a weak letter of recommendation: since letter writers often feel 
obligated to write a letter upon request, it isn’t the letter itself, but the strength of the 
letter that provides us with the most information. A recommendation that praises 
penmanship and punctuality, though technically positive, actually seems to suggest a 
more negative opinion on account of how much more positive it could be.   
 
  
40 
 
Figure 2.6. Both human subjects (left) and the probabilistic attribution model (right) infer 
that a strong essay reflects the author’s attitude (and more so for a freely chosen essay). 
However, a weak essay only indicates a consistent attitude if the essay position was 
freely chosen; a weak essay taking a position assigned by the experimenter indicates that 
the author is actually likely to oppose the essay position.  
 
Again, while the qualitative pattern of results is expected under the probabilistic 
attribution model regardless of parameter details, we will evaluate the predictions using 
as many of the same parameter values we had used in the previous demonstrations.  We 
used the same situation strengths as previously (s=1.38 and -1.38; i.e. 80% of people who 
are neutral about legalization would be compelled to write in the direction they were told), 
and we assumed prior beliefs about attitude to be centered on neutral (d~N(0,1)).   
Since in this experiment the actions were explicitly non-binary, we switched to 
the Beta-likelihood function (eq. 3), which relates action propensity to a continuous scale 
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from 0 to 1 (θ was, somewhat arbitrarily, set to 10).  Accordingly, we rescaled the 4 essay 
strength ratings from the 1-10 scale they were rated on by Jones et al (1971) onto this 0 
(strongly favor legalization) to 1 (strongly against legalization) scale. For example, an 
essay rated as a 6 on the 10 point scale would correspond to an action strength of 0.55, 
which can be interpreted as a percentile: roughly 55% of essays one can imagine would 
be more strongly against legalization, and 45% would be more strongly in favor of 
legalization. 
Figure 2.6, panel B shows that similar to the inferences people make, when the 
situation exerts no pressure, probabilistic attribution infers authors’ attitudes that scale 
with expressed essay strength. However, when the essay position was externally 
motivated, a weak essay is taken as evidence that the authors true attitude is actually 
opposed to the expressed position: a situation that encourages a pro-Legalization essay 
would yield an 80th percentile essay strength from a neutral person; and seeing a 60th 
percentile essay instead implies that the author’s disposition pushed the author in the 
direction opposite from the situational pressure.   
 
Inverting the FAE: Inferring situation when attitude is known (Quattrone, 1982) 
The FAE hypothesis posits that people overestimate the influence of disposition 
and underestimate the influence of situations. Thus, under the FAE account, we would 
not expect people to infer situational influences when a known disposition can account 
for the observed action. However, a curious finding suggests just the opposite: when 
people know an actor’s disposition, they are more likely to “over-attribute” the actor’s 
action to situational pressures.  This result is symmetric with the over-attribution to 
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disposition observed in classical FAE experiments, but is completely inconsistent with 
the conventional interpretation of those results. 
Quattrone (1982) asked subjects to read an essay favoring or opposing the 
legalization of marijuana, but instead of telling readers that the essay position was chosen 
or assigned, he told them that the author was known to have either a neutral opinion 
about legalization, or an opinion consistent with the attitude expressed in their essay. 
Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to determine if extraneous 
experimental factors (e.g. experimenter bias) might be influencing the opinions people 
expressed. After reading the essay, subjects were asked to estimate the likely situational 
pressure on a 30-point Likert scale (-15: pressure to oppose, 15: pressure to favor). Thus, 
just as the classic FAE paradigm manipulates situation strength and measures inferred 
disposition, Quattrone manipulated disposition strength and measured inferred situational 
influence. Even when subjects were told that the author held a pro-legalization view, they 
estimated that there was pressure to write a pro-legalization essay, and vice versa 
(original data replotted in Figure 2.7, panel A).  
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Figure 2.7. Inferred situation as a function of the essay and the known attitude. A: 
Subjects inferred that the position expressed in an essay was evidence for how much the 
situation was motivating behavior, both when they thought the author had a pre-existing 
attitude, and when the didn’t. The situation inferred was stronger when they thought the 
author had no pre-existing opinion. B: The ideal observer also infers that the situation 
was pressuring the essay position, but more so when the author had no existing opinion. 
 
According to the logic of the FAE account, this pattern of results could be 
considered an “over-attribution” to situational factors, since the pre-experiment attitude is 
known to have caused behavior. This finding is inconsistent with classic explanation of 
the FAE and calls into question the theoretical accounts of the FAE that claim that we 
have a inclination to over-attribute behavior to dispositions, and not attribute enough to 
situations (e.g. Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988).   
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Figure 2.8. Graphical model show that situation and disposition influence the probability 
that an action will occur. Instead of conditioning on (observing) situation and the action, 
and inquiring about situation, here we condition on disposition and action, and inquire 
about the strength of the situation. 
 
 A probabilistic attribution account, however, predicts this pattern of results.  
When someone behaves in a way that is motivated by their known disposition, it is still 
reasonable to infer that the situation was also motivating the action, given that 
probabilistic dispositions do not completely determine behavior. Assuming the same 
generative process as explained previously (Figure 2.1), inferring the unknown situation 
strength given a known disposition is symmetric inferring the disposition given a known 
situation (Figure 2.8). Knowing the disposition and what action the agent chose, but 
having a prior distribution over types of situations people encounter, we can use Bayes 
formula to derive a posterior probability of the impact of the situation: 
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 .  
This framework provides mirrored inferences to the framework used to reason 
about disposition: probabilistic attribution should always estimate that the situation had 
some influence in favor of the observed action. Just as we would infer that a museum 
patron who gives a donation is somewhat generous even when a docent is watching, we 
should also infer that when a generous friend donates, the docent is likely exerting some 
pressure on her.. And just as an action is more informative of an actor’s disposition in 
situations exerting weak (or contra-action) influences, the action is more informative of 
situations when dispositions are weak (or oppose the observed action). Again, so long the 
actor’s disposition does not compel them to act identically in all situations, it is 
reasonable to infer that the situation had some influence.  
In the Quattrone (1982) task, the ideal observer model again observes a binary 
action (either a Pro- or Anti- Marijuana essay) but now knows the author’s legalization 
attitude and must infer the strength of the situation. We formalize the “no opinion” 
attitude as a disposition strength of d=0 (equally likely to write a pro- or anti-legalization 
essay under no situational pressure), and the “existing opinion” condition has a 
disposition strength of d=1 and -1 (for pro and anti-legalization essays, respectively; 
meaning that these people would write essays consistent with their opinions 73% of the 
time when given the choice). Just as before, we used a logistic transformation and 
rescaled the expected posterior situation strength to place it on the same scale as 
Quattrone (1982). 
P(s | a,d) = P(a | s,d)P(s)
P(a | s ',d)P(s ')
s '
∑
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Again, probabilistic social attributions are consistent with humans, and in this 
case, both are inconsistent with the classic FAE account (Figure 2.8). Readers estimate 
that the experimental situation influenced authors toward the position expressed by the 
essay, both when the author purportedly had no prior opinion and when the authors were 
reported to have a prior opinion consistent with the essay position (albeit to a smaller 
degree). Again, we note that the qualitative pattern of inferences is robust to parameter 
variation (see Appendix A). Thus, the probabilistic attribution model can capture both the 
FAE effect, as well as the inverse FAE effect, where human behavior is directly opposite 
to the predictions of the FAE hypothesis.  
 
Inferring disposition when actions are ambiguous (Snyder and Frankel, 1976). 
In the classic FAE paradigm readers are asked to infer an essay author’s 
disposition while the experimenter varies the essay. Snyder and Frankel (1976) worried 
that the FAE might arise because the behavior (i.e. an essay on a controversial topic) 
might be disproportionately salient compared to the situation (i.e., whether or not the 
essay was assigned), and thus held the observed behavior constant while manipulating 
observers’ beliefs about the situation. Observers watched a silent video of a woman 
answering some questions. One group of subjects was told the conversation topic was 
either sex (a higher anxiety situation) or politics (a lower anxiety situation) before 
watching the video, and the other subjects learned the topic only after seeing the video. 
Observers then completed two sequential questionnaires: first, how anxiously the woman 
behaved in the video; second, how anxious was this woman in general (dispositional 
anxiety).  Snyder and Frankel found that altering observers' beliefs about the situation 
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changed how the same behavior was interpreted, and the subsequent dispositional 
attributions were comparable to the original FAE paradigm: observers who perceived 
anxious behavior inferred a more anxious disposition, and vice versa. We demonstrate 
that probabilistic attribution explains why belief about situations influences perceptions 
of behavior, and as a consequence, subsequent questions to generalize from the perceived 
behavior will yield corresponding dispositional inferences.  
 
Displayed Anxiety 
Immediately after watching the interview observers judged how 
comfortable/uncomfortable and how tranquil/upset they thought the woman behaved 
during the interview. They answered both question on a 1 (not at all anxious) to 9 
(extremely anxious) scale, yielding a summed “perceived anxiety” score between 2 and 
18 (by summing the two responses).  Observers who knew ahead of time that the topic 
was sex interpreted the behavior as more anxious than observers who thought she was 
discussing politics. However, observers who found out the topic only after watching the 
video estimated anxiety to be the same, regardless of the topic (Figure 2.9, panel A).   
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Figure 2.9.  Perceived anxiety as a function of interview topic, and whether this was 
known before or after watching the video. A: Observers who had a belief about the topic 
when they watched the video interpreted the woman’s behavior to be more anxious than 
average when they believed she was talking about sex (dotted line), but less anxious than 
average when they thought she was discussing politics (solid line). Observers who were 
unaware of the topic while watching the video thought she displayed neutral anxiety. B: 
The ideal observer infers that an ambiguous behavior was more likely to have arisen from 
anxiety when the topic is thought to encourage anxiety (sex; dotted line), compared to an 
ambiguous behavior produced in a situation that discourages anxiety (politics; solid line). 
When nothing is known about the situation, ambiguous behavior is no more or less likely 
to have arisen from anxiety. In this uninformative situation nothing is known about the 
cause of the behavior, and so anxiety level is inferred to be neutral.  
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 It seems intuitive that that we use context to interpret behavior, particularly 
ambiguous behavior: e.g., crying can be an expression of happiness (e.g., at a wedding) 
or sadness (e.g., at a funeral). The probabilistic attribution framework provides a natural 
mechanism to capture the intuition that our inference about someone’s current state or 
mood combines observations of their ambiguous behavior with information about the 
situation. We extend the generative process underlying the probabilistic attribution 
framework (disposition and situation combine to produce the propensity for an action), 
by separating the current internal state (the propensity for an action) from the observed 
behavior itself with the assumption that the observed behavior is a noisy (but unbiased) 
reflection of the current internal state (Figure 2.10).  In the Snyder and Frankel case, the 
internal state is the anxiety that the interviewed woman feels (which is influenced by the 
conversation topic), while the observed behavior is her ambiguously anxious body-
language.  
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Figure 2.10. Inferring the current state from ambiguous behavior: Situation and 
disposition combine to influence the current internal state (as in Figure 2.1), and the 
observed behavior is a noisy reflection of the internal state.	  
  
Formally, we consider the internal state (x) to be drawn from a Beta distribution 
as in eq. 3, and the observed action (a) to be drawn from a beta distribution centered on x:  
 
 
 
      
                                                    
x ~ Beta qθ, (1− q)θ( )
a ~ Beta(xk, (1− x)k)
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as in our previous cases, we take θ=10, and we set k=2. We can obtain inferences about 
the internal state of an actor by specifying some beliefs about the situation, and the 
ambiguity of the behavior. We take the woman’s actions in Snyder and Frankel’s 
stimulus to be perfectly ambiguous (behavioral anxiety of a=0.5 on a sale of 0 to 1), the 
topic of sex to be an anxiety provoking situation (s=1, i.e., 73% of dispositionally neutral 
people would be anxious in that circumstance), and politics to slightly reduce anxiety (s= 
-0.5, i.e., a person who feels anxious half the time would be anxious only 37% of the time 
while discussing politics8).  In the “after” condition, nothing is known about the topic 
while watching the video, so we assume the situation is neutral (s=0). As in all previous 
simulations, we rescale our model estimates to the empirical scale (2-18) used in the 
experiment.   
Figure 2.9 shows that the current (internal) anxiety estimated by probabilistic 
attribution is consistent with human judgments: compared to an unknown topic, an 
ambiguous action is perceived as more anxious in the context of an anxiety-provoking 
topic and less anxious when the topic discouraged anxiety. 
 
Inferred Dispositional Anxiety 
After answering questions about how anxious the woman was in the video, 
subjects next answered a variety of questions about how anxious they thought the woman 
                                                
8Snyder and Frankel’s choice of politics as a non-anxiety inducing topic may be 
contentious now, but seems more plausible of the early 1970s when there was less 
political polarization (Layman et al, 2006). Here, this assumption is only useful to capture 
the lower perceived anxiety in the “before-politics” than the “after” condition: if we 
assume that politics is a “neutral” (s=0) topic, then perceived anxiety would be equal in 
the “before-politics” and “after” conditions, but the discrepancy between “before-sex” 
and “before-politics” would remain. 
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was in general (e.g. how apprehensive she would be in a future situation, her percentile 
rank on anxiety, etc.).  From this questionnaire, Snyder and Frankel calculated a 
“dispositional index” on a scale of 0 to 100 (Figure 2.11, panel A). Observers who had 
used the topic to inform their perception of the woman’s anxiety in the video (because 
they had been told the topic ahead of time) inferred that she was generally more anxious 
when the topic was purported to be sex rather than politics.  In contrast, observers who 
did not know the topics while watching the video, and thus did not perceive any 
differences in the woman’s anxiety, showed a striking reversal of this pattern: they 
estimated that the woman was less anxious in general if they were told she had been 
discussing sex, rather than politics (Figure 2.11, panel A). 
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Figure 2.11. Inferred dispositional anxiety as a function of the topic, and when the 
observer learned the topic. A: Observers who knew the topic before watching the 
interview inferred that the woman who they thought had been discussing sex had a more 
anxious disposition in general (dotted line) compared to the woman who was asked about 
politics. (solid line). Observers who only learned about the topic after seeing the video 
made the opposite inference, thinking the woman who had been discussing politics had a 
more anxious disposition than the woman who’d been asked about sex. B: An ideal 
observer infers that the woman who displayed anxious behavior, (sex condition, dotted 
line) has a more anxious disposition than the woman who didn’t display anxious behavior 
(politics condition, solid line). However, when there was no difference in perceived 
anxiety (after condition) the ideal observer infers that the woman has a more anxious 
disposition when it learns that she was discussing politics, and a less anxious disposition 
when it learns she was discussing sex. 
 
Although the judgment of dispositional anxiety while knowing the situational 
pressures is superficially similar to the classic essay paradigm, the crucial difference here 
is that the perceived anxiety has itself been inferred from the situation, rather than 
directly observed (as discussed in the previous section). Thus, observers try to infer 
dispositional anxiety from the anxiety they had perceived in the video and the current 
situation; in other words, observers condition on the perceived anxiety in the video to 
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judge general dispositional anxiety.9 Consequently, the perceived anxiety used to 
estimate dispositional anxiety is high in the before-sex condition, low in the before-
politics condition, and somewhere in the middle in the after conditions. In the before 
conditions, attribution to dispositional anxiety unfolds as in the classic FAE paradigm: an 
action perceived as high anxiety, although somewhat explained by the situation, still 
suggests higher dispositional anxiety (and vice versa for low anxiety). In contrast, in the 
“after” conditions, observers could not use the topic to judge the woman’s anxiety in the 
video (thus they perceived the same neutral level of anxiety), but they can use the topic to 
estimate her dispositional anxiety. Observers seem to reasonably infer that someone who 
seemed neutral when in an anxiety provoking situation is likely to not be an anxious 
person in general, and someone who was neutral in an anxiety-reducing situation is more 
likely to be generally anxious. 
Probabilistic attribution naturally captures this intuition, and thus reproduces the 
striking reversal in human judgments of dispositional anxiety in the before and after 
conditions. We use the same model parameters as in the previous section, and infer the 
dispositional anxiety by conditioning on the temporary, state anxiety the model had 
previously estimated.  The qualitative pattern of inferred dispositional anxiety matches 
that of human observers, and the intuition outlined above (Figure 2.11, panel B).  Again, 
we note that this result is obtained without altering any parameters from the application 
                                                
9While it might at first seem odd to assume that observers condition on perceived anxiety 
to infer dispositional anxiety (rather than jointly inferring both properties, which would 
not yield the behavioral patterns), such sequential conditional inference seems to be the 
norm for humans; for instance, people seem to condition on their previous answers when 
making new judgments about the same visual stimulus (Jazayeri & Movshon, 2007; 
Stocker & Simoncelli, 2008).	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of probabilistic attribution to estimating perceived anxiety – this result falls naturally out 
of conditional inference under uncertainty. 
 
Experimental Support for Unbiased Social Attribution   
We have demonstrated that six experiments classically interpreted as evidence 
that observers show a bias to over attribute behavior to situation (as well as a seemingly 
contradictory finding that we over-attribution behavior to situations) is predicted by a 
Bayesian inference framework.  Using the information reported in the existing literature 
we have shown that the general pattern indicative of a FAE can be accounted for by this 
framework under reasonable parameter settings.  However, reliance on the classic data 
does not allow us to test all of the critical predictions of this model, so we conducted 
three studies aimed to test the predictions delineated in the What makes a situation 
informative about disposition? section above.  Specifically, if observers’ social reasoning 
is consistent with an ideal observer, we expect: (1) if the same action is observed, 
attribution to internal qualities should decrease systematically as situational pressure is 
perceived to increase. Likewise, attribution to situation should decrease systematically as 
the influence of internal qualities are perceived to increase.  (2) We would also expect to 
see inferences that have classically been interpreted as an FAE – observers should infer 
that the unobserved feature (either internal quality or situational influence) is consistent 
with the observed behavior (e.g. a pro-Castro essay should indicate a pro-Castro attitude). 
Making no inference here– as was previously proposed as the normative model – would 
not be consistent with optimal inference. However, (3) when the observed variable (either 
situation or internal qualitie) is perceived to totally compel the observed behavior, then 
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no attributions should be made regarding the unobserved variable – this would be 
evidence of a genuine attribution error. Finally, this inference framework views social 
reasoning as essentially a process of inferring, under uncertainty, the most probable 
unobserved variables given the observed variables– within this framework there is no 
reason to think that situations and internal qualities are reasoned about differently than 
other latent causal variables, therefore, (4) reasoning about situation or internal quality 
should be equally subject to predictions delineated above.  
 
A New Experimental Paradigm: Bucket Toss 
According to the framework we have proposed, the relevant variables involved in 
social inference, which are sometimes known and sometimes unknown, are situational 
pressure, the relevant internal quality, and resulting behavior.  To more directly test the 
predictions of our social inference model we need a scenario that involves an 
unambiguous situation and an unambiguous internal quality that maps directly to an 
observable behavior.   We therefore invented a scenario that involves a made-up carnival 
game called bucket-toss. The objective of bucket-toss is to throw a quarter into a 
container (the observed action) from a fixed distance.  In bucket-toss the size of the 
container can change (situational influence) and – as is usually the case in the world – 
individuals have varying skill (the internal quality) at this game. We first obtain objective 
measure of the perceived strength of the situation (e.g. how many people would make a 
quarter into a given container from five feet away), and then in two experiments we 
varied the container size and known skill, respectively, to compare human inferences to 
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an ideal observer making inferences about either an unknown internal quality or an 
unknown situation given identical information. 
 
Obtaining empirical estimates of situation strengths 
Methods 
The goal of this first study was to simply determine how strong different 
situations are perceived to be. This experiment was run online using participants recruited 
using Amazon Mechanical Turk.  There were 143 participants who each completed five 
trials of the experiment. Participants first read that they would see five different 
containers and, after each, would be asked to judge how hard it would be to toss a quarter 
into the container from 5 feet away. On each trial the participant saw a profile image of a 
person standing 5 feet away from a container (Figure 2.12, see Appendix C for all profile 
images).  
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Figure 2.12. On each trial participants were presented with an image of a person and a 
container randomly selected from the five possible containers. Participants could select 
how many people out of ten they thought would make the quarter into the particular 
container shown by moving the toggle left or right from five. As the toggle moved the 
word below the image changed between integers indicating “roughly x” number of 
people 
 
 
For each participant, each of the five containers (Figure 2.13) appeared once in a random 
order.  In our model, the strength of the situation is defined as the proportion of people 
who would be compelled to perform a certain action, so questions were phrased in a way 
meant to elicit responses appropriate to this definition.  On each trial participants were 
asked if “ten different people tied to toss a quarter into this container from five feet how 
many of these ten would you guess make the shot?”  Participants used a mouse to move a 
toggle on a sliding scale. At the beginning of each trial the toggle started at the center 
(which corresponded to five people) and participants could indicate they thought more 
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than five people would make the shot by moving the toggle to the right to, or less than 
five people by moving the toggle to the left. The number of people indicated by the slider 
position appeared below the scale, and this changed dynamically as the participant moved 
the slider. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. In this study, to obtain objective perceptions of a semi-continuous situation we asked 
observers to rate how many people out of ten would be able to make, from five feet away, a 
quarter into each of these five containers.  
 
 
Results  
Although the number that participants saw appeared as integers (e.g. “roughly 7 
people”), for finer granularity we recorded responses on a continuous scale based on the 
toggle location as a proportion between 0 (0 people) and 1 (10 people).  On average 
(responses were skewed, so the median response was used) observers believed that only 
.06% of people could make the quarter into the shot glass, 23% of people could make it 
into the Solo cup, 59% of people could make the 5-gallon bucket, 79% of people could 
make the ice-tub, and 99% of people would make the shot into the kiddie pool.  
Importantly, as the container size increased, judgments about the proportion of people 
who could make the shot increased monotonically and were largely non-overlapping 
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(Figure 2.14).  These features are important as they validate that these container sizes 
effectively communicate distinguishable situational pressures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Each of the five containers we perceived to have distinguishable situation 
strengths. Because the parameters in the social attribution model are additive in log-odds 
we logit transformed the proportions, which are the units shown on the x-axis. The 
proportions that corresponds to each are shown in parentheses. For example, a situation 
that would compel a proportion of .92 people to make the shot correspond to s = 2.5.  
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Experiment 1: What internal-quality is inferred when situational pressure is varied?  
Methods 
In this experiment, we measured observers’ inferences about a player’s bucket-
toss skill when they perform a certain action (make or miss the shot), which was either 
motivated or discouraged by the situation (container size), so that we can compare this 
behavior to an ideal observer model constrained by empirically estimated perceptions of 
situation strength.  This experiment was conducted online with participants recruited 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. There were 299 participants, who each made ten 
judgments.  Participants were told the rules of bucket-toss: it is a game in which players 
try to toss a quarter into various containers from a fixed distance. These initial 
instructions were presented along with an image of the five containers that would be seen 
during the experiment. Participants were also told that they would see a series of players 
and that they would need to guess how skilled each person was at the game. On each trial, 
participants saw a profile image of a person standing a fixed distance away from a 
container, and were told the person either made or missed the shot (Appendix D). 
Observers were asked to report how skilled they thought the player was, and they made 
this judgment by moving the toggle on a numberless sliding scale that ranged from “very 
unskilled” on the right and “very skilled” on the left, with “average” in the center. As the 
participant moved the toggle the words below the scale changed dynamically to reflect 
how the toggle position corresponded to the percentage of people better or worse than the 
target player.  On each of the ten trials the container presented was selected randomly 
with the constraint that each would appear twice per participant. Whether the player was 
shown to make or miss the shot was determined randomly on each trial. The name and 
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image of the player shown was selected randomly from a bank of 12 (6 males and 6 
females; Appendix C) with the constraint that each person/name would only appear once 
per participant.  
 
Model and Results 
We can now compare how humans attribute actions to traits of an individual and 
the attributions of an ideal observer.  The ideal observer uses estimates of situation 
strength (container difficulty) obtained previously, to estimate the skill level of a bucket-
toss player who either made, or missed, a shot into a container of a particular size (Figure 
2.15, panel A).  Likewise, we obtain human observers’ ratings of skill level on those 
same types of trials (Figure 2.15, panel B).   
 Human judgments track the critical predictions of the probabilistic social 
attribution model: (1) For a particular action (made or miss) attribution to internal 
qualities decreases as perceived situational pressure increases. (2) The unobserved 
variable (skill) is estimated to be in a direction consistent with the observed behavior 
(above average skill is inferred when the person makes the shot, below average skill is 
inferred when the person misses the shot). (3) However, no attributions are made when 
the situation is perceived to be totally compelling – when the player makes the quarter 
into the kiddie pool or fails to make the shot glass.  
 These data also show the expected “fundamental attribution error” style behavior: 
when situations weakly motivate the behavior (missing the Solo cup v. making the ice 
bucket), inferred ability differs between making and missing a toss (t(603) = 10.78, p 
< .001).  This inference is weaker than in the least constraining situation (five-gallon 
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bucket; t(597) = 11.51, p< .001), but it vanishes entirely in the very influential situations 
(shot glass vs kiddie pool; t(580) = .075, p = .94 . Together, these results show that when 
we parametrically manipulate situation strength, and measure the strengths people 
estimate for these situations, human behavior is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent 
with probabilistic attribution.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.15. Inferred ability at bucket-toss as a function of container size, and whether 
the player made or missed the shot. A: The inferences made by the ideal observer 
illustrate the critical predictions of the social inference framework. When the player 
makes the shot (black line) the ideal observer infers that this is indicative of above-
average ability at bucket-toss, but as the situation exerts more pressure to miss the shot 
(smaller containers) more exceptional ability is inferred. Likewise, when a player misses 
the shot (dotted line) the ideal observer infers that the player is below average at bucket-
toss, but as the situation becomes more conducive to making the shot (larger containers) 
more exceptional inability is inferred. No behavior-consistent inference are made when 
the situation becomes nearly deterministic – missing the shot glass or making the kiddie 
pool. B: Human inferences are consistent with the critical predictions of the social 
inference model. When action is held constant, attribution to ability decreases 
systematically as situational pressure is perceived to increase. Behavior-consistent 
inferences are made until the situation is perceived to be totally compelling.  
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Experiment 2: What situational pressure is inferred when internal-quality is varied? 
In the previous experiment the unknown variable was bucket toss skill, which was 
inferred given knowledge about the success of the shot and the container size. This is 
analogous to most attribution experiments—participants are asked to infer an unknown 
internal quality given an observed situation and action.    However, the Bayesian social 
attribution framework says that the pattern of inferences in these studies arises due to 
inferring unknown variables under uncertainty, patterns of inference should be similar 
regardless of whether the unknown feature is the situation or the disposition. So, in this 
experiment we were interested in the inferences people would make about the situation 
(container size) when the internal-quality (skill at “Bucket Toss”) is known, and how this 
compares to the inferences of an ideal observer operating with the same information.  
 
Methods 
This experiment was conducted online and 305 Amazon Mechanical Turk users 
participated. Each participant competed eight trials. It was important that participants 
thought the situation (the container the player was aiming for) was chosen at random and 
was not related to their skill at “Bucket Toss.” (e.g. it was not a “level” they had 
achieved). To this end, we told participants that “Bucket Toss” is a popular carnival game 
of “skill and chance,” and that the first step in the game is the “the luck of the spin” -- 
that players first begin the game by spinning a large wheel which determines which 
container they’ll aim for. An image of a person spinning a wheel was shown along with 
images of the five containers on which the spinner could land (these were the same 
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containers as used previously; Figure 2.13). Participants were told that players would 
have to try to toss a quarter into whichever container the pointer indicated from a fixed 
distance away.  On each trial participants were presented with a profile image of a 
person. When the trial began a graphic of a question mark was in the place where the 
container would be. The participant was told the players’ skill-level in terms of percentile 
(e.g., “Jenifer is better than 99% of people at Bucket Toss”) as well as whether the person 
made or missed the shot they were aiming for. Participants then indicated which 
container they thought the player had been shooting for. On each trial the skill percentile 
(1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, or 99th) and whether or not the person made or missed the shot was 
selected at random. The person-image and name were selected at random with the 
constrained that they could only appear once per subject.   
 
Response Scale  
Participants were asked which container they thought the player had been aiming 
for, but their responses were given in the form of a bet. We changed the scale in this way 
in order to provide participants with a meaningful way to express little or no 
information10. They were told to imagine that that they had $10 to bet, and that they could 
                                                
10 The reason we used this more complicated response scale was because the center of the 
simpler scale used in Experiment 1 would not have been meaningful. If an observer has 
little or no information about a person’s skill (for example, in Experiment 1 when the 
player made a shot that about 50% of people could make) it makes sense to guess this 
player is about average – if you have some assumption that skill is normally distributed, 
than average (the middle of the scale) is the optimal guess when you have no other 
information. However, in this experiment if a participant has little or no useful 
information about container size there is no meaningful way to express this on the 
conventional scale, since the center of the scale (the 5-gallon bucket) is no more likely to 
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distribute the bets over multiple containers. They could distribute these bets by dragging 
a toggle along a one-dimensional line. The response scale started with the toggle in the 
center of the scale with monetary bets distributed equally over the 5 buckets ($2 on each 
bucket; Figure 2.16, panel A). Below the response scale buckets were ordered from 
smallest to largest. As the participants dragged the toggle to the right this indicated they 
were betting more money on the larger containers; as the subject dragged the toggle to 
the left this indicated they were betting more money on the smaller containers.  A 
histogram that corresponded to the proportion of money bet on each container acted as a 
visual cue that changed dynamically as participants changed their bets. Before the 
experiment participants were given examples of the meaning of the response scale. For 
example, they were told that if you were asked to bet on which container a man had used 
to give his dog a bath than they might distributed bets over many containers (Figure 2.16, 
panel B), dragging the toggle toward the right to place money disproportionately on the 
larger containers, meaning that they bet roughly $6 that he gave his dog a bath in the 
kiddie-pool, roughly $3 that he used the drink-tub, roughly $1 that he used the 5-gallon 
bucket, and less than a $1 that he used the red-cup. On the other hand, if they wanted to 
bet all $10 that the man gave his dog a bath in the kiddie-pool they could drag the toggle 
all the way to right, indicating that all $10 was placed on this container (Figure 2.16, 
panel C). If they were asked which container they thought a man used to hold liquid they 
                                                                                                                                            
occur than any other container (there is a one in five chance for each container. Being 
able to distribute bets allows for a uniform distribution of bets, which is optimal with no 
other information. 	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might leave the toggle in the middle of the scale, indicating that they were distributing 
bets equally among all containers (Figure 2.16, Panel A). 
 
 
Figure 2.16. The response scale started with the toggle in the center of the scale with monetary 
bets distributed equally over the 5 buckets (A) Participants could move the toggle toward the 
right to place money disproportionately on the larger containers (B), or to the left to place bets on 
smaller containers (not shown). Moving the toggle all the way to the right (or left) indicated a bet 
of all $10 on the most extremely size container, for example the kiddie pool (Panel C). 
 
 
Model and Results 
Again, we can compare human attributions to the attributions of an ideal observer.  
The ideal observer uses internal-quality (skill percentile) to estimate the situation strength 
(container size) when the player either made, or missed a shot (Figure 2.17, panel A). 
Likewise, we obtain human observers’ judgments of the most probable container size on 
those same types of trials (Figure 2.17, panel A). 
 Again, we see the graded pattern of inferences predicted by probabilistic 
attribution: as we increase the ostensible skill of the player (strength of the internal 
quality), observers’ estimate a missed shot to be ever more diagnostic of container size, 
and made shots become ever less diagnostic. However, in these data, human judgments 
are not consistent with all of the predictions of the probabilistic social attribution model: 
container size is only estimated to be in a direction consistent with the observed behavior 
  
68 
when the players’ skill is at or above the 50th percentile and makes the shot, or at or 
below the 50th percentile and misses.  The pattern for missed shots might make sense as a 
consequence of the response scale we used – there is no difference in judgments between 
the 25th and 1st percentile conditions, perhaps because people are encouraged to distribute 
bets homogenously.  However, the counterintuitive pattern for made shots is more 
puzzling: people estimate that a 99th percentile player who made a shot is likely to be 
throwing into one of the smaller containers; this peculiar pattern might be a consequence 
of people not fully believing that container size is allocated randomly to players, and thus 
believe that an especially skillful player is likely to be matched up with an especially 
challenging target.  This might imply a fascinating direction for future research: people 
do not believe situations and dispositions to be independent – dispositions likely 
influence what situations we find ourselves in. 
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Figure 2.17. Inferred situation as a function of skill, and if the player made or missed the 
shot. A: The inferences made by the ideal observer illustrate the critical predictions of the 
social inference framework. When the player makes the shot (black line) the ideal 
observer infers that this is indicative of a situation that facilitates the behavior (a larger 
container); a missed shot (dotted line) is indicative of an impeding situational force (a 
smaller container). No situational inference is made when the skill becomes 
deterministically strong – the exceptionally skilled player would make any shot presented, 
the exceptionally unskilled player would miss. B: Human inferences are consistent with 
the prediction that when action is held constant, attribution to situation decreases as skill 
is perceived to increase. Unexpectedly, however, no inferences about container size is 
made when a player in the 75th percentile makes the shot, or a player in the 25th percentile 
or below misses the shot, and one of the smaller containers is inferred when a player in 
the 99th percentile makes the shot.  
 
Discussion 
 Our results show that human attribution of behavior to situational and 
dispositional causes – which has long been considered systematically biased to 
overestimate dispositional influences – is consistent with sensible inferences if situations 
and dispositions are thought to influence behavior probabilistically rather than 
deterministically.   
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This probabilistic social attribution model yields the patterns of behavior 
classically interpreted as evidence of the FAE and can capture how such behavior varies 
due to prior expectations about attitudes, as well as varied and ambiguous action 
strengths. Furthermore, the probabilistic attribution model explains a pattern of 
“overattribution” to situations, which is exactly antithetical to The Fundamental 
Attribution Error hypothesis.  Classic experiments on social attribution, which have been 
interpreted as evidence of a systematic error, seem instead to yield robust evidence that 
human social attribution reflects reasonable inferences in a world where neither situations 
nor attitudes are sufficient to fully determine behavior.  
Our intention in this work is to broadly demonstrate that behavior traditionally 
interpreted as a bias in the classic FAE literature is also consistent with an unbiased 
probabilistic reasoning framework. Our intention here is not to suggest that this specific 
instantiation of probabilistic inference is necessarily the precise way in which humans use 
information to reason socially. It is critical to note that a “rational” model might be 
rendered consistent with human judgments merely by adding a biased prior about the 
strength of situations (i.e. by supposing that situational constraints are systematically 
underestimated); however, this would amount to merely reframing the FAE in 
probabilistic jargon. For instance, Jennings (2010) assumed that reasoning about 
dispositions could be explained by Bayesian inference using a biased prior, and showed 
that people’s attributions could still be internally consistent. Our account does not rely on 
such a strategy, which is perhaps most clearly illustrated in the fact that we can capture a 
situation in which people behave inconsistently with the typical explanation of the FAE: 
over-attributing behavior to the situation when disposition is known (Quattrone, 1982, 
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Experiment 2). This result, and the rest of those we present, do not arise from simply 
cooking in mis-calibrated expectations about situations, but rather arise from the structure 
of probabilistic causal inference.  
 Beyond demonstrating the classic literature is qualitatively consistent with this 
framework, we also directly test predictions of the social inference model by obtaining 
objective measure of the perceived situation strengths so we are able to compare human 
attributions to internal-qualities to the attributions of an ideal observer without having to 
make any assumptions about how strong observers think situations are.  We show that 
when we parametrically manipulate perceived situation strength, human observers’ 
inferences are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with probabilistic attribution. 
We also show that when we manipulate disposition parametrically inferences about 
situation are largely consistent with an ideal observer (though there are inconsistencies 
that arise and warrant further investigation).  
 Indeed, the critical contribution of our paper is to show that the causal structure 
employed in the probabilistic social attribution model is sufficient to capture the effects 
of the social attribution literature.  The qualitative match between our model and human 
behaviors is not sensitive to variation in parameters: all sensible parameter values (please 
see Appendix A and B for elaboration) would yield the qualitative effects in the classic 
FAE studies.  
In short, our work suggests that results from decades of attribution experiments, 
which have been classically interpreted as evidence that our social inferences are 
fundamentally flawed, might instead be the natural outcome of reasoning about a 
complex and uncertain world.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
The Fundamental Attribution Error is not a peculiar phenomenon that arise from 
probabilistic attribution under a narrow set of parameter values.  Instead, it is inherent to 
the structure of probabilistic attribution, and only under extreme (and unrealistic) 
parameter values would probabilistic attribution not exhibit this pattern. To illustrate 
behavior in classic tasks using a probabilistic observer, we needed to make assumptions 
about parameters not collected in the original studies: 1) observer’s belief about situation 
strength, 2) observers’ belief about the central tendency of peoples’ dispositions and 3) 
variability of dispositions in the world. When a binary action (e.g. a pro or anti essay) is 
observed, the degree of FAE can be thought of as the difference between the attitudes 
inferred from the two distinct actions (difference between the points on the dotted grey 
indicated by the green bracket in panel A), normalized by dividing by the difference in 
the attitudes inferred from these same actions in the unconstrained situation (difference in 
the points on the solid grey line indicated by the blue bracket). This ratio represents the 
proportion of the difference in the inferred attitude that the two actions produce even 
when the situation is constraining. Note that changing the assumption about the average 
attitude in the population has no effect on the FAE, it simply shifts all of the inferences, 
leaving the ratio representing the degree of FAE intact (red lines in panel B) 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Although belief about the central tendency of the disposition doesn’t change the degree 
of the FAE, the perceived strength of the constraining situation and the perceived 
dispersion of attitudes in the world does have an effect on the degree of FAE. Critically, 
however, the probabilistic social attribution model produces the pattern of inferences 
indicative of a non-negligible FAE for a wide range of parameters values.  Until the 
pressure of the constrained situation is interpreted to be nearly deterministically strong (a 
situation in which over 98% of neutral people would be compelled to perform the action), 
we observe a pattern of inference consistent with an FAE. This pattern holds regardless 
of whether the variability of dispositions is assumed to be very low (gray points) or very 
high (green points). The black arrow indicates the parameter values we adopted in our 
models of the classic empirical studies. 
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Chapter 2, in full, is currently being revised for publication of the material. 
Walker, Drew E.; Smith, Kevin; Vul, Edward. The dissertation author was the primary 
investigator and author of this paper.  
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Abstract 
In a now classic experiment, Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz (1977) showed that 
observers think that a participant who is randomly assigned to invent questions has more 
general knowledge than a participant assigned to answer these questions. These 
questioner-contestant results have been interpreted as conceptually related to the 
Fundamental Attribution Error: observers don’t properly adjust for the advantage 
afforded by arbitrary social roles when making judgments about others (e.g. they ignore 
“role-conferred advantages”). The implication in the literature is that this error is 
evidence of a non-normative reasoning process. However, since errors are not always 
indicative of irrationality, here we specify and test the non-normative processes that 
could cause this behavior: (1) observers don’t consider all of the available information 
that is relevant to this judgment, or (2) they do consider relevant information, but 
systematically under-appreciate situational influences. In two series of experiments, we 
demonstrate that observers (a) are sensitive to the advantages conferred and 
disadvantages imposed by social roles, (b) are better calibrated to the social-roles used in 
this paradigm than has been argued, and (c) make sensible use of other information 
available to them. 
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Imagine you are a university student listening to a professor lecturing on her topic 
of expertise. Do you take her behavior at face-value and conclude she is generally 
brilliant, or do you consider that she is speaking on a topic for which she has unique 
idiosyncratic knowledge? It has been proposed that “in drawing inferences about actors, 
perceivers consistently fail to make adequate allowance for the biasing effects of social 
roles upon performance” (Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977). That is, that we do not 
account for these role-conferred advantages when forming impressions of others – we 
make judgments based on the behavior we witness without properly adjusting for the 
advantage afforded or disadvantages imposed by social roles, and fall victim to a “a 
special case of a more fundamental attribution error.” In the classic demonstration of this 
phenomenon, Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz (1977) asked students to play a quiz game in 
which one participant was randomly assigned the task of inventing questions (the 
“questioner”) and the other was assigned to try to answer these questions (the 
“contestant”). Unsurprisingly, the questioner was able to invent questions that the 
contestant failed to answer correctly, but despite explicit awareness of the different and 
arbitrary roles, observers still inferred that the questioner had more general knowledge 
than the contestant.  
The implication in the literature is that this error – like errors in general—is 
evidence of non-normative behavior. However, errors can easily arise from normative 
behavior— even the most rational observer will make errors when operating with 
incomplete or inaccurate information. Since there is more than one decision-making 
process that could result in this pattern of inference, if we hope to understand the source 
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of the error, and whether or not it results from a non-normative social reasoning process, 
it is important to articulate these possibilities.   
One non-normative reasoning process that would result in the role-conferred 
advantage behavior is that observers don’t consider all of the available information that is 
relevant to the judgment they are asked to make. For example, they don’t consider the 
different role constraints, or they don’t utilize information present in the question content, 
and they make judgments based simply on which player knew the answer to more 
questions. A classic explanation for errors in social inference is the idea that “behavior 
engulfs the field” (e.g., Heider, 1958, p. 54; Snyder & Frankel, 1976) and observers are 
so influenced by behavior that they fail to consider more nuanced features of the 
scenario. If the role-conferred advantage does indeed arise from this simple heuristic 
account, we would expect a questioner who asks more questions to always be judged as 
superior on general knowledge but a more rational observer to be sensitive to their 
relative performance in light of their social roles. We would also expect an observer who 
is taking advantage of relevant information in the contestant-questioner exchange to also 
be sensitive to features beyond social roles, such as the difficulty or cleverness of the 
trivia questions the players ask or answer.  
Another possibility is that the role-conferred advantage arises not because 
observer doesn’t consider social roles or other relevant information, but because they 
systematically under-appreciate the situational influences – observers take the social role 
into account, but they underestimate the advantage it provides the questioner. This might 
arise if observers generally underestimate how much idiosyncratic knowledge the average 
person has; thus evidence that the questioner knows something the contestant does not 
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would mean that the questioner simply knows more things. Even though the average 
person would be able to invent ten challenging trivia questions if put in the same position, 
observers don’t realize this and so average behavior seems above average.    
In two series of experiments we investigate to what extent human behavior is 
consistent with either of these non-normative explanations.  By modulating the number of 
questions asked and answered, we demonstrate that it is not the case that observers are 
using a simple heuristic that totally ignores differential social roles. Players who know 
the correct answer to more trivia questions are not always judged to have superior general 
knowledge. Furthermore, observers also seem to utilize other relevant information, as 
smart and clever questions have a predictable influence on the inference observers made. 
We did find evidence when the use of idiosyncratic knowledge is made salient observers 
no longer judge the questioner to be above average, or superior to the contestant, and the 
classic role-conferred advantage disappears. However, underestimating others’ use of 
idiosyncratic knowledge may not be what is driving the classic inference pattern in the 
quiz game paradigm. Surprisingly, we found evidence that the average contestant actually 
can’t invent ten challenging questions in the time allotted, and so it’s questionable if the 
inferences observers made in the original scenario are actually errors at all.   
 
Experiment 1  
In Chapter 2 we showed that observers are sensitive to the intensity of others’ 
actions when making inferences—for example, observers infer that a stronger pro-
marijuana essay indicated a stronger pro-marijuana attitude compared to a weak pro-
marijuana essay and the inferences they make about different actions is predicted by an 
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ideal observer (Figure 2.6). If observers are making rational inferences in the quiz-game 
paradigm, we would expect the degree of the inference to scale with the observed 
behavior, but also that the relevant behavior should depend on which player is being 
evaluated. That is, an observer who considers the different roles should not simply make 
judgments by comparing the simplest common action: who knew the correct answer to 
the most questions.  The questioner demonstrates their knowledge by inventing trivia 
questions, and so this person could be evaluated on dimensions such as the difficulty and 
breadth of their questions, or even more simply: how many trivia questions she is able to 
invent. The contestant on the other hand demonstrates her level of general knowledge by 
answering questions-- this person could be evaluated on dimensions such as how many 
questions they are able to answer correctly, and how difficult those questions were.    
 
Experiment 1a 
In Experiment 1a we held the number of questions the questioner asked constant 
and manipulated the number of questions the contestant was able to answer.  One 
possibility is that observers are totally insensitive to the different roles, and are simply 
judging the players based on which player knows the correct answer to the most 
questions. If so, we would expect the contestant to never be rated equivalent to the 
questioner until this person can answer all of their questions.  On the other hand, it could 
be the case that observers are aware that different roles make it easier for the questioner 
to know the answer to more questions, but they simply underestimate how advantageous 
the role of questioner is. That is, they are aware of the difference but underestimate the 
magnitude of this difference. If this is the case – they know that inventing ten challenging 
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trivia questions is easier than correctly answering ten questions someone else invented – 
we would expect that at some point the contestant’s behavior to be impressive enough to 
be judged as equivalent to the questioner, even before this person can answer all ten 
questions. From the original study the questioner is judged to be above average and 
superior to the contestant, who is rated about average.  If observers demonstrate 
sensitivity to the different roles, this manipulation also allows us to identify at which 
point the questioner’s behavior is seen as impressive enough to be judged to have general 
knowledge that is as exceptional as the questioner’s.   
Stimulus Creation 
In order to produce a set of trivia questions that accurately reflected what 
undergraduate students could produce in a 15-minute period (the time allotted in the 
original experiment) we brought 19 UCSD students into the lab (one group of eight and 
one group of eleven) who received partial course credit for their participation. Students 
were seated around a conference table and the instructions described in Ross, Amabile, 
and Steinmetz (1977) were read aloud to the group by the researcher.  Subjects were told 
that their task was to create ten challenging but not impossible trivia questions for which 
they knew the answer, and that these answers should be only one to a few words long. 
They were given some examples of typical trivia questions (e.g. Who is the Greek 
Goddess of victory?) and told to avoid both easy questions (e.g. number of days in April) 
and unfair questions (e.g. the name of their brother), and were encouraged to draw from 
their own areas of interest or expertise. They were told that they would next take turns 
asking their trivia questions to one another.  
In order to both produce a set of realistic incorrect answers and get an objective 
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measure of question difficulty subjects next took turns reading their questions aloud 
while the other participants answered the questions silently with pen and paper. The 
questioner was instructed to go at a pace that would allow others to generate and write a 
response; those answering questions were told to ask the questioner to slow down if 
necessary. The experimenter wrote answers to questions along with the subjects to make 
sure the pace felt appropriate and asked the reader to slow down when necessary. 
Subjects produced 124 usable questions total (Appendix A; some subjects were unable to 
generate 10 questions in the time allotted; some of the questions generated did not meet 
the specified criterion. This is discussed in more detail in Experiment 1c).  
 
Participants 
Subjects were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk Marketplace and 
received money for participating. Three-hundred and sixty people attempted the task, but 
fifty-six participants were eliminated before data analysis for clicking through the 
experiment without moving the response scale or for not passing an attention check, 
leaving 304 participants that were included in data analysis. 
 
Procedures  
Participants read that they would be witnessing the interaction of two 
undergraduate students who had participated in this activity in an academic psychology 
lab setting. They were told that these students arrived at the lab and were asked to 
participate in a general knowledge quiz game in which one person was randomly 
assigned (by coin flip) to have the job of being the questioner and the other was assigned 
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the job of being the contestant. The participants read the instructions the questioner was 
given (described previously in the stimuli section), and were told that the questioner 
posed each question to the contestant one at a time and the contestant answered as best as 
he/she could. The participant then watched what they were told was a replay of this 
interaction.  
In each of ten trials the participant first saw the trivia question the posed by the 
questioner (Figure 3.1, A) and next saw the contestant’s response and whether or not the 
response was correct (Figure 3.1, B) or incorrect (Figure 3.1, C). If the response was 
incorrect the correct answer was also shown. Between-subjects, we varied the number of 
questions the contestant had answered correctly (either zero, four, six, eight or ten). For 
each participant, the ten questions were drawn at random from the 124-question stimuli 
set, and which questions were answered incorrectly by the contestant was also 
determined randomly. The incorrect answers displayed were the modal incorrect answer 
given by subjects in the stimuli creation phase (or if there was no modal incorrect answer, 
we used an incorrect answer that seemed reasonable). After watching the ten trials unfold 
chronologically participants were asked to judge how much general knowledge the 
contestant and questioner, respectively, had relative to other people. Each judgment was 
elicited in a randomly determined order. This rating scale was specified as the proportion 
of people with more or less general knowledge than the target person, and participants 
made these ratings using a sliding scale that ranged from “less general knowledge” to 
more “general knowledge,” centered on “average.” Thus, effectively, we asked observers 
to rate the general knowledge percentile of the questioner and contestant. The proportion 
that corresponded to the toggle position was shown, and changed dynamically as the 
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toggle was moved.  
 
Figure 3.1. On each trial the trivia question posed by the questioner appeared alone on the 
screen (A) and when the participant had finished reading the question they could advance 
to the contestant’s response. On contestant-correct trials (B) the contestant’s response 
appeared on the screen followed by the words “the contestant’s answer was correct!” in 
green lettering. On contestant-incorrect trials (C) the contestant’s response was given 
followed by the words “the contestant’s answer was incorrect” in red lettering and with 
the correct answer, provided in parenthesis.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Importantly, we were able to replicate the original Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz 
(1977) finding on this online platform. When the questioner asked ten trivia questions 
and the contestant answered four of these (the number the average contestant was able to 
answer in the original study) observers judged the questioner to be in the 66th percentile 
and have general knowledge superior to the contestant who they judged to be in the 50th 
percentile (t(118) = 4.9, p < .001; Figure 3.2, A).  
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As expected, when the contestant was able to answer a larger number of questions 
correctly, observers inferred they had more general knowledge. When the contestant 
answered two or fewer questions, observers thought they were below average on general 
knowledge; when they could answer six or more, they thought they were above average; 
and when they could answer four correctly, observers inferred the contestant had an 
average amount of general knowledge. Interestingly, this inference is well-calibrated to 
ground truth: participants in the stimuli generation phase were, on average, able to 
answer about four questions (M = 3.7, sd = 1.7). This is also similar to the average 
number of questions that Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz (1977) reported their contestants 
were able to answer. So, as expected, observers are sensitive to the contestant’s actions: 
the more questions they answer, the more general knowledge they are inferred to have.  
Moreover, observers seem well-calibrated to constraints imposed on the contestant: the 
average person can answer about four questions, and when contestants answer four 
questions out of ten, they are judged to be average.  
The questioner (who is always seen to ask ten questions) is inferred to be well 
above average, and thus deemed to possess more general knowledge than the contestant, 
up until the point that the contestant can answer eight questions correctly. At this point 
the players are judged be no different on general knowledge (t(118) = .73, p = .46) and 
both to be well above average in the 73rd percentile. This suggests that people are not 
using a simple heuristic that knowing more questions amounts to having more 
knowledge, regardless of the role. If observers were insensitive to social roles, we would 
expect the questioner to always be rated as superior until the questioner was able to 
answer all ten questions. Experiment 1a suggests that the discrepancy between the ratings 
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of the contestant and questioners’ general knowledge is not due to a total blindness to 
different social roles, or to a miscalibration to the constraints imposed on the contestant, 
but -- consistent with the original study -- arises from a miscalibration to the role of the 
questioner – the questioners’ ability to invent ten challenging Trivia questions seems to 
exceed our expectations.     
 
Figure 3.2. The rated general knowledge of the contestant and questioner as a function of 
(A, Expt 1a) the number of questions answered correctly (given that ten were asked), and 
(B, Expt 1b) the number of questions that were asked (given that three were answered 
correctly).  (A) As the contestant answers more questions she is rated as having more 
general knowledge, at about four out of ten answered correctly, she is estimated to be 
about average. The role-conferred advantage (contestant is rated as less knowledgeable 
than the questioner) holds when the contestant answers fewer than eight out of ten 
questions. (B) As the questioner asks more questions she is rated as having more general 
knowledge. When she asks only four question the role-conferred advantage reverses and 
she is estimated to have less general knowledge than the contestant and to be numerically 
below average. When she asks seven questions she is rated equal to the contestant, and 
when she asks ten questions the role-conferred advantage reemerges.  
 
 
Experiment 1b 
Observers infer that the questioner is well above average on general knowledge 
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when they are able to invent ten challenging trivia questions in ten to fifteen minutes, 
suggesting that although observers are aware that questioners have an advantage, they 
underestimate the magnitude of this advantage. Observers find the ability to invent ten 
challenging trivia questions for which they know the answer indicative of exceptional 
general knowledge ability, even though in Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz (1977) all of the 
students randomly assigned to this role were able to do this. In this experiment we 
investigate what observers expect the performance of the questioner to be by varying the 
number of questions the questioner is able to invent. The logic is that the number of 
questions at which the questioner is judged to be average should reflect observers’ 
expectations of average performance in this role.  
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace and 
received money for participating. One hundred and fifty participants attempted the task, 
but 31 participants were eliminated before data analysis for either clicking through the 
experiment without ever moving the response scale, or for not passing an attention check, 
leaving 119 participants that were included in data analysis. 
 
Materials and Procedures 
 The procedures used in Experiment 1b were similar to Experiment 1a except here 
we varied the number of questions the questioner produced, holding the number of 
questions the constant was able to answer constant at three. The participant always 
watched all ten trials unfold. In one condition the questioner asked all ten question, but in 
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the other two conditions the questioner was shown to be unable to produce all ten 
questions, and instead asked only four or only seven. Trials in which the questioner asked 
a question were identical to trials in Experiment 1a. Trials in which the questioner was 
unable to think of a questions always appeared last (the last three when the questioner 
asked seven questions and the last six when the questioner asked four questions). On 
trials where the questioner was shown to be unable to think of a question the screen read 
“The questioner asked: [questioner was unable to think of another question].” These trials 
were followed by a screen that read “The contestant responded: [no response given 
because no question was asked].” The stimuli used were the same 124 questions used in 
Experiment 1a, chosen at random for every participant. As in Experiment 1a, after seeing 
the ten trials the participant rated the general knowledge of the contestant and the 
questioner, again in a randomly determined order using the same response scale 
described previously.  
  
Results  
Observers were indeed sensitive to the different number of questions the 
questioner was able to invent – rating questioner as having less general knowledge when 
they invented fewer questions. We again replicated the original role-conferred advantage 
pattern – when the questioner asked ten questions and the contestant answered three, 
observers judged the questioner to be in 62nd percentile and to have superior general 
knowledge (t(73) = .73, p = .46). In this case, observers now rated the contestant to be in 
the 40th percentile in general knowledge (perhaps because here they answered one 
question fewer than empirically demonstrated in our data and the original paper).  When 
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the questioner is able to invent only four questions observers rate their general knowledge 
to be below average  in the 48th percentile (but statistically indistinguishable from 
average; t(38) = 16.8, p < .001), and when they invent seven questions they are seen as 
being slightly above average in the  53rd percentile and to have general knowledge that is 
on par with the contestant t(40) = 15.01, p < .001), 
 
Experiment 1c 
From Experiment 1b it seems that observers expect questioners to be able to 
invent between four and seven questions.  But, according to Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz 
(1977) the Stanford students who participated in the original study were able to invent ten 
appropriate trivia questions in the time allotted. So, from this is seems that the role-
conferred advantage arises because we expect the average contestants to invent fewer 
questions than they can, and when we witness more we infer they are above average.   
However, surprisingly, in the stimulus generation phase (described above) the 19 UCSD 
students tasked with inventing ten trivia questions in accordance with the criterion 
specified in Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz (1977) were actually not all able to complete 
the task. Of the 190 questions expected, only 174 questions were produced, and only 124 
of these were deemed appropriate to use in Experiment 1a and 1b. Questions were 
eliminated if the answer provided by the writer was incorrect or if the question was 
ambiguous (e.g. “What is considered a popular Thai food?) or if it did not meet other 
criteria specified in the instructions, such as having no precise or concise answer (e.g. 
“why were tomatoes once called poison apples?”).  On average, participants were able to 
invent about seven (M = 7.15, sd = 2.19) usable trivia questions in the time allotted.  
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From the behavior of the questioners in the original study, observers’ expectations in 
Experiment 1b deviate quite a bit from ground-truth (they expect players to be able to 
invent between four and seven questions, when player can invent ten) however, if we 
compare observers expectations to performance of our participants in the stimulus 
generation-phase the deviation between expectations and reality is not as extreme (they 
expect players to invent between four and seven questions, and players can invent 
roughly seven). Because this behavior is not consistent with the behavior reported in the 
original study we wanted to replicate the stimulus generation phase. Forty-three UCSD 
undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course credit, and procedures were the 
same as described previously with the exception that students were not actually required 
to read their questions aloud after they had produced them. Students were told that they 
would be required to do this, though, in order to ensure that these participants had as 
much incentive to produce ten high-quality questions as previously.  
 
Results  
As before, this group of 43 students were not all able to produce ten acceptable 
trivia questions in the fifteen minutes allotted.  Figure 3.3 shows the number of questions 
students were able to produce before any filtering of question content was performed. 
These numbers were obtained by simply counting the number of blanks in which 
participants wrote any words.  Of the 43 students 21 of them filled in fewer than 10 
blanks, and 22 students filled in all of the blanks.  To systematically determine which 
questions were actually appropriate trivia questions and answers, a research assistant who 
was blind to the purpose of the study filtered the questions. She believed she was 
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choosing questions that would be appropriate to use as trivia question in a future study.  
The number of questions that participants generated that met criteria is shown in Figure 
3.3.  Twenty-five questions were eliminated because the answer provided was incorrect 
(e.g. the United States became a country in 1769; San Diego is the second largest city in 
the U.S), twenty-four questions were eliminated because they did not have a clearly 
defined answer (e.g. “What type of bias can be found in our society?”; “How many hours 
of sleep is best?”), and nine were eliminated for having no precise or concise answer (e.g. 
“Define test-retest reliability.”)  After this filtering, participants, on average, were able to 
invent 7.39 appropriate trivia questions (M = 7.39, sd = 1.90). This is very similar to the 
number of trivia questions invented by the 19 participants in the stimulus generation 
phase (M = 7.15, sd = 2.19).   
There are several possible reasons that participant behavior in this task differs 
between UCSD students and students in the original study. It could be that Stanford 
students are better than UCSD students at inventing trivia questions. However, there is no 
description of question-vetting in the original paper, so another possibility is that 
Stanford students were also not able to invent ten questions that met the standards, but 
this was not discovered. If the researchers didn’t check the answers the questioners 
provided, they might not realize that the indicated answer was incorrect (e.g., there are 
206 bones in the human body, rather than the provided answer: 260). Since the main 
issue in our study was that participants asked questions with multiple possible answers, or 
the answer provided was incorrect, and this was not discovered until systematically 
vetting the questions using the internet, it seems plausible that this could be the source of 
the discrepancy (since answers to arbitrary trivia questions are considerably harder to find 
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without modern search engines).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. The number of question participants invented. The left panel shows the 
number questions for which participants wrote anything.  Of the 43 participants, 22 
students attempted all ten questions, while the other 21 students attempted fewer than ten 
questions. The panel on the right shows the number of questions that were complete and 
accurate trivia questions. Participants, on average, wrote 7.39 appropriate questions on 
average. 
 
 
 Discussion 
In Experiment 1a we showed that observers are, at least coarsely, sensitive to 
different role constraints. We showed that observers’ ratings of the contestant were 
sensitive to changes in the contestant’s behavior, but also that these inferences were 
consistent with ground-truth. On average, people can answer about four trivia questions 
in this scenario, and contestants shown to answer four questions were inferred to have 
average general knowledge.  This is consistent with the theory that when we know the 
impact a situation should have on behavior, we adjust our judgments appropriately.  
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Because observers have direct experience with the contestants’ role constraints (as they 
are aware of how few of the questions they are able to answer themselves), they discount 
based on this role appropriately. Further, there is some awareness that the questioner is in 
an advantageous position. When the contestant is able to answer eight trivia questions 
they are rated to have general knowledge as exceptional as the questioner’s, and when 
they can answer all ten questions they are rated to have general knowledge that is more 
exceptional. Thus, when participants observe that both the questioner and the contestant 
can answer all of the questions correctly they judge the contestant as more 
knowledgeable, which suggests that they are aware that the questioner has an easier job. 
However, the fact that average performance is seen as exceptional suggests that observers 
may underestimate just how much easier their job is. Indeed, in Experiment 1b we 
showed that observers infer the questioner to be average when he can invent between four 
and seven questions. Although this could suggest that observer underestimate average 
performance, we do not believe this is the case. Inventing ten challenging trivia questions 
in fifteen minutes actually is exceptional behavior – on average our questioners were only 
able to invent between 7.15 (stimulus generation phase) and 7.39 (Experiment 1c). In this 
light, inferring that a questioner who invents ten trivia questions is above average is 
consistent with actual performance on this task. That said, observers do not seem to be 
perfectly calibrated to the strength of this situation as they judge a questioner who invents 
between four and seven questions to be average, which underestimates the actual average 
performance. Perhaps the most revealing condition to examine is the condition that most 
closely captures ground-truth: when the observer invents seven questions (only slightly 
less than true average performance) and the contestant correctly answers three of these 
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(also only slightly less than true average performance). In this case the role-conferred 
advantage disappears: the two players are judged to be equally above average on general 
knowledge – which isn’t necessarily an over-attribution of general knowledge 
considering that it was college students – a group likely to have greater general 
knowledge than the average person – who could produce about seven questions on 
average.  
 
Experiments 2 
In Experiment 1 observers’ ratings showed sensitivity to the number of questions 
the questioner invented and the contestant answered. But these are very blunt indicators 
of general knowledge, and if judgments are made by rationally estimating the general 
knowledge that the questioner and contestant are drawing on then these judgments should 
be sensitive to details of the questions, not merely how many were asked or answered 
correctly. We next tested if observers use more nuanced information, such as question 
difficulty (Experiment 2a), whether the questions content is diagnostic of general 
knowledge (Experiment 2b), and the breath of topics reflected in the questions 
(Experiment 2c) to inform their judgments about the players’ general knowledge.    
 
Experiment 2a 
To manipulate question difficulty, we selected the ten most and least difficult 
questions of the 124 trivia questions produced in the stimuli creation phase of Experiment 
1 (Appendix B). The easy question set consisted of the ten questions that had been 
answered correctly by participants most often (>90% of the time) and the difficult 
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question set consisted of the ten questions that had been answered correctly least often 
(~1.8% of the time). To put this in context, questions from the stimulus generation phase 
were answered correctly 36.5% of the time on average.  
The procedures were very similar to Experiment 1a, except that here we varied 
between subjects whether the questioner asked ten easy questions or ten hard questions. 
Additionally, on contestant-incorrect trials, the incorrect response read “I don’t know” 
rather than an incorrect guess.  Participants were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk marketplace and received money for participating. One hundred and sixty-seven 
people attempted the task, but 45 participants were eliminated before data analysis for 
either clicking through the experiment without ever moving the response scale, or for not 
passing an attention check, leaving 122 participants that were included in data analysis.   
Observers were sensitive to question difficulty when judging the general 
knowledge of questioners and contestants. When questions were harder, observers rated 
general knowledge as greater for both questioner and contestant (F(1,120) = 21.45, p < 
.001).  Moreover, ratings showed the classic “role-conferred advantage” pattern of 
inference: questioner rated as more knowledgeable than contestant (F(1,120) = 24.28, p < 
.001).  Both questioner and contestant were rated to be above average in the difficult 
question condition, but only the questioner was rated above average in the easy-question 
condition.  
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Figure 3.4. The rated general knowledge of the contestant and questioner as a function of 
whether easy or hard questions were asked. The questioner is always rated higher than 
the contestant, but both players are rated higher when the questions are harder.   
 
 
Experiment 2b 
Using question difficulty to infer the players’ general knowledge is only a rational 
thing for observers to do in cases when difficulty is in fact indicative of general 
knowledge. A person who has a lot of general knowledge will be able to ask public 
knowledge questions that few people know the answer to. However, being able to ask 
questions that are hard to answer is not necessarily indicative of having a wealth of 
general knowledge.  Even a questioner with exceptionally little general knowledge can 
stump a Jeopardy champion by asking them to report the questioner’s middle name. Here 
we tested if observers distinguish between question difficulty and question diagnosticity 
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when making judgments. 
We varied question difficulty (hard v. easy) and how diagnostic the questions 
were of general knowledge (diagnostic v. non-diagnostic) between subjects.  The 
procedures were very similar to those used in Experiment 1, except that we used four 
distinct sets of ten questions, designed by the experimenter (Appendix C).  The hard-
diagnostic question set comprised challenging questions about  collective knowledge 
(“What was the code name for the Battle of Normandy?”), the hard-non-diagnostic 
question set included difficult to answer questions about facts that one would expect to be 
specific to someone’s life experience (“I am from Chadron Nebraska, what high school 
did I attend?”); the easy-diagnostic questions had answers that most people know, but 
revealed deeper knowledge on the part of the questioner  (“Liberty Island was named 
Bedloe's island, before the construction of which NY monument?”) and the easy-non-
diagnostic questions were easy, and revealed no particular knowledge on the part of the 
questioner (“What is the day after Saturday?”). Participants were recruited from the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace and received money for participating. One 
hundred and seventy-six people attempted the task, but eighteen participants were 
eliminated before data analysis for either clicking through the experiment without ever 
moving the response scale, or for not passing an attention check, leaving one hundred 
fifty-eight participants that were included in data analysis. 
In the case where questions were diagnostic, we observed the classic “role-
conferred advantage” pattern in which the questioner was rated higher than the 
contestant, and both the players were rated as having more general knowledge when the 
question set was difficult compared to easy, however question difficulty differentially 
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effected players when questions were non-diagnostic  (F(1,154) = 18.09, p < .001).  In 
the non-diagnostic case there was a similar pattern of judgments about contestant: they 
were rated as having more general knowledge when they answered harder questions 
compared to easier questions, t(86) = 7.8, p <.001When the contestant could not answer 
easy questions they were judged to have less general knowledge than the questioner who 
invented these easy questions (t(106) = 4.7, p <.001), and both players were inferred to be 
below average. However, a contestant who could answer some of the private-knowledge 
(hard non-diagnostic) questions was rated above average.  
 The question of primary interest was whether observers made more sophisticated 
inferences than simply using question difficulty as proxy for general knowledge, and this 
does seem to be the case.  How much general knowledge observers rated a questioner to 
have didn’t depend on how difficult the questions were when the questions were non-
diagnostic – a questioner who asked questions that were not diagnostic of general 
knowledge was inferred to be below average, regardless of whether their questions were 
easy or hard to answer (t(86) =.20, p = .84).  Likewise, a questioner who asked diagnostic 
easy questions was inferred to have higher general knowledge than a questioner who 
asked questions of the same difficulty that were not diagnostic of general knowledge 
(t(89) = 2.9, p = .004).  This means that observers are not simply evaluating knowledge 
based on the difficulty of the questions, but are instead using the questions to estimate the 
contestant’s knowledge. 
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Figure 3.5. The rated general knowledge of the contestant and questioner as depending on 
question difficulty and whether questions were diagnostic (left panel) or non-diagnostic 
(right panel).  When questions are diagnostic, the questioner is always rated higher than 
the contestant, but both players are rated higher when the questions are harder. When 
questions are non-diagnostic the contestant is rated below average and below the 
questioner, but she is rated above average and above the questioner when she answers 
hard questions that are non-diagnostic. However, when the questions are non-diagnostic 
the question difficulty does not affect ratings of the questioner, and she is rated below 
average regardless of question difficulty.   
 
 
Experiment 2c  
In the previous experiment observers realized that difficult questions about unique 
private knowledge are not reliable indicators of a questioners’ general knowledge.  In this 
experiment we test if observers are sensitive to more subtle indicators that questions are 
being drawn from idiosyncratic knowledge.  Being able to invent ten challenging trivia 
questions on a wide variety of topics should be more indicative of general knowledge 
than inventing ten challenging questions on a specific topic (which might suggest specific 
expertise or a pet-hobby).  Here we vary between-subjects whether the questioner is 
shown to ask questions from a variety of topics or on only a specific topic.  The stimuli 
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consisted of ten sets of ten trivia questions designed by the experimenters. Each question 
set was on a particular topic (e.g. Harry Potter, Modern Politics, see Appendix D).   In the 
specific condition the questioner asked all ten questions from one question sets, which 
was chosen at random. In the breadth condition the questioner asked one question 
selected at random from each of the ten separate question sets. Contestants always 
answered four of these questions correctly. Participants were recruited from the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk marketplace and received money for participating. Eighty people 
attempted the task, but ten participants were eliminated before data analysis for either 
clicking through the experiment without ever moving the response scale, or for not 
passing an attention check, leaving 70 participants that were included in data analysis 
 
Results 
 We find that observes are sensitive to this more subtle cue that the questioner is 
relying on idiosyncratic knowledge when inventing questions, and observing a “conferred 
advantage” depends on question set, F(1,68) = 4.3, p = .043. When the questions are 
drawn from ten different categories the questioner, as usual, is rated above average (64th 
percentile) on general knowledge that is superior to the contestants (49th percentile; t(28) 
= 2.8, p <.001). However, in the specific question condition this discrepancy vanishes –- 
the questioner is no longer inferred to be above average, or to have more general 
knowledge than the contestant, t(40) = .28, p = .78.  
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Figure 3.6. We replicate the classic role-conferred advantage paradigm when the 
questioner asks questions from ten different categories (breadth condition). However, the 
questioner and contestant are rated equal on general knowledge when the questioner asks 
questions that are entirely from the same category.  
 
Discussion 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c showed that observers are sensitive to progressively 
more nuanced features of question content, suggesting they are using this information in a 
rational way to estimate that questioner and contestants’ knowledge.  First, observers 
seemed to use question difficulty to inform their judgments, rating both the questioner 
and contestant as having more general knowledge when harder questions were 
asked/answered and having less general knowledge when easier questions were 
asked/answered.  From Experiment 2b and 2c it seems that observers use more than 
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superficial qualities of difficulty (e.g. can they themselves answer the question), but other 
features diagnostic of general knowledge, such as whether the questions revealed private 
or public knowledge of whether they were drawn from a narrow or wide range of topics.  
When questions were hard but non-diagnostic, or drawn from only a narrow range of 
topics observers did not use these questions as positive indicators of general knowledge 
ability.   
 
General Discussion 
Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c reveal that observers are not only aware of the 
different role-constraints, but they are also pretty well calibrated to the difficulty of each 
role. In Experiment 1a we showed that observers rate a contestant who answers eight or 
more questions equal to or superior to the questioner, suggesting that observers are not 
just comparing how many questions each player answered correctly regardless of the role 
constraints. Further, observers’ judgments suggest that they have a good sense of average 
contestant behavior -- participants, on average, can answer about four questions, and this 
is what observers judge to be average. Surprisingly, observers also have a good sense of 
average questioner behavior. Initially it seemed like observer underestimate how easier 
the questioners’ role was since observers judged average behavior to be above average. 
However, it turns out asking ten questions is above average behavior – in Experiment 1c 
we found that most people actually can only invent about seven questions.  
In addition to being reasonably calibrated to and using social roles when making 
judgments, observers also seem to utilize other information present in the exchange.  
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c suggest that observer use nuanced information present in 
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question content as cues to infer general knowledge. They are sensitive to question 
difficulty, question diagnosticity, and the breadth of the question set when reasoning 
about questioner and contestant’s behavior.   
Overall, it seems that the judgment pattern in the role-conferred advantage is not 
evidence of non-normative behavior.  Observers seem to rationally consider role-
constraint as well as other available information that is relevant to the judgment they are 
asked. The one error observers seem to make is slightly (but not as much as previously 
thought) underestimating the number of questions the questioner can invent. Previously 
we have shown (Chapter 2) that people use perceived situation strength optimally. When 
presented with the task of tossing a coin into a bucket, for example, observers have a 
good sense of the strength of this situation and inferences about disposition match those 
we expect from an ideal observer.  However, this does not preclude the possibility that 
people are not perfectly calibrated to all situations, particularly ones they have never 
experienced. Do we really expect observers to be know exactly how many questions the 
average person can invent in 15-minutes? It seems likely that some situations seem a 
bit easier than they are (e.g. saying no to an experimenter in a white lab coat who asks 
you to shock someone), and in these cases average performance will seem unimpressive. 
Likewise, there are some situations that are seem harder than they look (e.g. inventing 
trivia questions), and average performance will seem impressive. Imperfect estimation of 
strange situations is not necessarily evidence of non-normative reasoning. 
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Chapter 3, in full, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the 
material. Walker, Drew E.; Vul, Edward. The dissertation author was the primary 
investigator and author of this  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The social information available to us at any given moment is ambiguous at best.  
Yet, remarkably we resolve this ambiguity efficiently and arrive at judgments and 
perceptions that are largely accurate. The fact that our people-perceptions do not always 
perfectly align with reality is not necessarily evidence that our social reasoning processes 
are flawed.  In the last three chapters I have shown that although social judgments are not 
always without error, many of the systematic errors we make can arise from being 
globally rational agents operating with incomplete information.  
In Chapter One I show that we have a bias to perceive faces in a group to be more 
attractive than they are, not because our information-processing is flawed, but rather as a 
consequence of our visual system’s strategy to circumvent resource limitations and 
capitalizing on redundancy in visual scenes.  The bulk of the previous work on ensemble 
coding has addressed simple features such as line-orientation and dot size (e.g., Ariely, 
2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003), and findings in Chapter One are at the forefront of a 
growing body of work beginning to illuminate how statistical properties influence 
information processing in attention and perception for high-level visual features. Findings 
that high-level features like attractiveness are subject to set averaging have had 
implications for understanding the mechanisms of visual processing (Huang, 2015). Such 
findings have also influenced work on how fast and efficient people-perception can affect 
real-life social organization and interaction (e.g., Phillips, et al., 2015), and has been used 
to investigate the face processing deficits in individuals with Autism. 
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In Chapter Two and Three I proposed that two of the most well known biases in 
social psychology can be explained by a rational inference framework. However, there 
are two criteria we might use to evaluate whether behavior in a given domain is rational: 
whether the reasoning process is internally consistent (coherence) and whether the 
judgments themselves are empirically accurate (correspondence; Dunwoody, 2009). The 
Fundamental Attribution Error as classically presented is a claim about coherence.  The 
fact that attributions are made in a direction consistent with behavior despite known 
situational pressure is suggested as evidence of a flawed process: we make dispositional 
attributions without properly discounting for the known influence of the situation (e.g., 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
These paradigms don’t measure or compare behavior to ground-truth as observers 
in these studies make attributions from an invented behavior about a fake actor, without 
an empirical comparison to average behavior. Therefore, the studies underlying this 
phenomenon can’t make a claim about correspondence. Thus, a sufficient challenge to 
the FAE is demonstrating coherence of human judgments in these paradigms, which we 
do in Chapter Two. We show that making attributions in a direction consistent with 
behavior when there is also known situational pressure is not in fact evidence of a flawed 
process, but is rather the rational judgment of a probabilistic observer.  In our modeling 
of the six classic study results, our argument that these judgments show coherence 
requires only two extremely conservative assumptions about observer sensitivity to 
situations: that they know the direction of the situational influence (being asked to write a 
pro-essay imposes pressure to write a pro-essay as opposed to an anti-essay) and that the 
influence of these situations is not deterministically strong (See Chapter Two Appendix 
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A and B for further elaboration). Still stronger evidence of coherence in social reasoning 
are Experiment 1 and 2 in Chapter Two, in which we obtain empirical perceptions of 
situation strengths and show that participants judgments can be explained as optimal 
inference using these situation strengths (and vice versa: judgments about the influence of 
situations is explained as optimal inference using known dispositions).  These results 
provide strong evidence the social judgments show coherence, a satisfactory challenge to 
the argument put forward in the original literature.  
Further, although it might not be readily apparent, the original role-conferred 
advantage study (Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977) itself provides some evidence that 
social judgments are coherent. In the original study, as well as in new data presented in 
Chapter Three, observers accurately judge the general knowledge of the contestant, 
suggesting that when observers have a good sense of the pressure imposed (having 
directly experienced the challenge of hearing questions they cannot answer) they make 
accurate judgments about the contestants’ general knowledge , providing further evidence 
of coherence. Taken in isolation, an observer’s lack of correspondence with regard to the 
questioner – their tendency to judge questioners as above average – could be explained as 
an issue of miscalibration to the situation or a lack of coherence. Because Chapter Two 
and Three provide converging evidence that social judgments are internally consistent, it 
seemed more plausible this tendency arises from coherent reasoning about a situation that 
was underestimated.  However, this was not what caused observers to rate the questioner 
above average. Surprisingly, we instead found evidence that observers are fairly well 
calibrated to expected performance in this role: in the condition that most closely 
approximated how both contestants and questioners actually do perform,  a “role-
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conferred advantage” bias disappeared, suggesting that observers are reasoning rationally 
here both with regard to coherence and correspondence.  Similarly, in Chapter Two, 
when we used empirically inspired essay compliance rate from Sherman (1980), human 
inferences matched those of an ideal observer, suggesting that human estimates of the 
strengths of these types of situations are at least in the right ballpark.   
Taken together, results from Chapter Two and Three strongly suggest that social 
reasoning is rational in terms of coherence, but also provides some evidence that – at 
least in these paradigms – there is correspondence in human social judgments.  Of course, 
demonstrating evidence of calibration in these paradigms certainly cannot answer the 
question of how calibrated people are to situations in general. As we know from some 
classic findings in psychology, we are not always accurate in such estimates: We are 
astonished by Milgram’s (1965) demonstration that an authority figure can compel 65% 
of people to ostensibly shock another person to death, and wildly underestimate how 
many people would do such a thing in this situation. But people may be bad at estimating 
the pressure that these particular situations impose, and so research into biases in social 
judgment might pick out and thus over-represent the situations that people have a 
particularly bad understanding of. This makes it difficult to get an unbiased estimate of 
how good observers are at evaluating the strength of everyday situations.  
Although we have shown calibration to one situation classically thought to be 
misestimated, calibration to the strength of situations more generally is an open question. 
If observers coherently use a rational inference framework but systematically 
underestimate the strength of situations than this could also result in consistently and 
erroneously judging dispositions to have an inflated influence on behavior.  From the 
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classic FAE literature this is indeed a possibility, however, this proposal is difficult to 
reconcile with results that suggest that when we make attributions from known 
dispositions, we show a tendency to “over attribute” to situations (Quattrone, 1982; 
Chapter 2, Expt. 2). The more parsimonious explanation is that both results are produced 
by the same mechanism: estimating an unknown variable using unbiased probabilistic 
inference.  
The view proposed in Chapter Two that social attribution can be better understood 
by using probabilistic reasoning has implications beyond explaining biased behavior in 
classic paradigms.  Bayesian probabilistic inference has been widely used as a framework 
to understand how humans are able to intelligently resolve uncertainty in domains such 
cognitive psychology and sensation and perception, but has been only sparsely applied to 
help us understand how humans reason about other humans (e.g. Baker, Saxe, & 
Tenenbaum, 2009), This framework could be applied much more broadly to inform our 
understanding of human social reasoning, and could help elucidate very consequential 
social phenomena, for example, stereotypes. Stereotypes result from perceived 
correlations between observable demographic features and unobservable character traits 
(e.g. gender and intelligence; race and criminality) that yield an undesirable influence on 
human judgments of individuals. Most research in this domain focuses on reducing 
prejudice, but not much attention has been given to where in the cognitive inference 
process these errors arise. Bayesian cognitive modeling could be used a formal 
description of this process to help determine, for example, if stereotypes arise because 
people overestimate the correlations in the world, if they rely on the incorrect conditional 
probabilities, or if they overweight socially charged attributes (e.g. gender) compared to 
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other features (e.g. occupation).  Furthermore, research on prejudice often presumes that 
stereotypes are emotional rather than statistical biases and consequently misses one 
straightforward approach to reducing prejudice. Insofar as prejudices arise because we 
rely on perceived statistics in the world, greater information about an individual will 
reduce how much influence demographic traits effect our judgments of others. Ignoring 
the statistical nature of stereotypes can even lead to counterproductive interventions. For 
example, the ban-the-box policy, which prevented employers from asking about criminal 
record on initial job applications, actually decreases the probability that low-skilled black 
and Hispanic men would be hired (Doleac & Hansen, 2016) since employers now 
discriminate more widely against groups that are more likely to have a criminal record. 
In addition to demonstrating the usefulness of applying a Bayesian probabilistic 
inference framework to social questions, Chapter Two and Three are also examples of 
how investigations of social phenomena can benefit from parametrically manipulating 
and measuring continuous variable.  This approach can put behavior into a broader 
context. By observing judgments made across a spectrum of situational influences, and 
action strengths, for example, we were able to see that inference patterns are sensible, 
which is a feature that was obscured when narrower samples of behavior were taken in 
the classic FAE and role-conferred advantage literature (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
Overall, the quantitative and computational techniques applied here can produce reliable 
and precise predictions of behavioral measures and allow for theoretically motivated 
advances in social psychology.  
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